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THE CRESSET

In Luce Tua

By DON A. AFFELDT

Comment on Current Issues

A Right of Privacy?
The question may sound strange, because the answer
to it may seem too obvious. As Americans, we are cultural heirs to a great tradition of privacy. This is seen
most clearly in the code of the American Frontier, which
forbade inquiry into a man's past - perhaps for fear of
learning too much about him. Then too, the Reformation
tradition , to which many of us subscribe, places primary emphasis upon a man's personal relation to God,
which is, one gathers, a matter of the heart and of the
mind or of that recessive, untouchable essence of a man,
his "soul," so easily screened from public scrutiny.
Many people have seen in the growing complexity of
society various threats to the cherished privacies of its
members. The information contained on one's 1040 tax
form furnishes a pretty good index to the life patterns
and special proclivities of its author. The census bureau,
credit company, and school, military, and employment
questionnaires all fish for data about us which some of
us would rather not reveal. When, further, it has become
technically feasible to collect this information gleaned
by disparate agencies into one central file on each of us,
the last vestige of our privacy seems on the way out. All
of which leads us to think that we have a right to privacy, not just an occasional desire for it. And it leads us
to wonder whether this is not an enforceable right, a
right which others can impinge upon only at their peril.
Not every people, or every age of peoples, has developed such a keen sense of privacy. In early Greek society, a "politics of participation" saw personal virtue equated with civic virtue, and privacy had no place. Similarly, the Germanic conception of the "folk" treated the
nation as the place in which the individual found his
true identity and expression. Even today there are countries in which it is not socially improper to inquire about
a man's income - and hence countries in which this
piece of data is not such an abiding curiosity.
If it is true, as some among us allege, that each of us
has a right to privacy, it is relevant to ask where that
right comes from and what is its scope.
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The supposition that the right of privacy is a natural
right raises a host of questions about what is meant by a
natural right, and whether it is even remotely plausible
to think that anyone has any of them. Fortunately for
those who believe that a man has a right to privacy, it
is not necessary to decide the question of whether or
not this right is a natural right. For it has already been
decided (for Americans, anyway, by the Supreme Court)
that we (Americans) have a legal right to privacy. The
landmark decision on this matter was Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Supreme
Court held that a Connecticut law forbidding the use
of contraceptives by married persons was unconstitutional, on the ground that the law invaded the sacred
realm of marital privacy.
In reaching the Griswold decision, it is arguable that
the Court asserted the existence of a legal right to (marital) privacy on the ground that there is a natural right
to (marital) privacy. The court, of course, did not say
as much, since natural law jurisprudence has long been
out of fashion in this country. Thus in the opinion of
the Court (if one can call it that; there were four separate opinions written for the majority and two vigorous
dissenting opinions, making a total of six different opinions from the nine Justices) the right of (marital) privacy "emanates" from other Constitutional rights. It is
part of the "penumbra" of rights guaranteed by various
of the first nine amendments to the Constitution.
The opinion in Griswold was novel in that for the
first time it explicitly asserted a Right of Privacy as
such, apart from any of the other legal categories (such
as trespass or property rights) usually invoked in breach
of privacy suits. But even so, the Court did not assert
an unconditional or unlimited Right of Privacy on the
part of American citizens. Indeed, the very suggestion
that a citizen has an unlimited or unconditional Right
of Privacy cuts at the very heart of the idea of social
organization.
One aspect of the idea of privacy is the notion of solitude - non-involvement with other members of society. But if everyone had and exercised that right,
there would be no society at all. Further, no one can
sensibly claim that his "right to be let alone," as Justice
Brandeis phrased it, is indefeasible. If that were a man's
legal right, he would legally be out of reach of social
control, which is the very purpose of law in the first
place. Hence, a legal system which conferred on its citizens a legal right to be let alone in all circumstances
would be utterly self-contradictory and obviously Impossible.
3

Big Brother in the Bedroom
So our legal right of privacy is far from unconditional.
Nor is it intrinsically valuable. Being let alone is not an
end in itself as part of the dignity of man . Even the
Fourth Amendment (where we start with the nearly absolute premise that a man's home is his castle) and the
Fifth Amendment (where we accord silence and secrecy
to the known or putative criminal), which most strongly
suggest the conception of privacy as an intrinsic good,
are hedged with devices to nullify the benefits they
promise.
In the case of the Fourth Amendment, provision is
made for the securing of warrants upon a showing of
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. What is thus prohibited is unreasonable searches
and seizures. In the case of the Fifth Amendment, the
right not to testify (for or) against oneself is balanced by
legal provisions for conviction even in the face of one's
stony silence. What the Fifth Amendment secures, then ,
is the right not to contribute to one's own conviction with
one's own testimony on the stand. This right arose not
from a keen respect for people's privacy so much as from
a felt need to curb the tendency of law enforcement
agencies to subject a suspect to the rack and screw as
the chief means of obtaining his conviction.
The right of privacy is extrinsically valuable. That is
to say, its value derives from the social utitility produced by granting to people such a right. But of course
once this is seen, it is immediately apparent just how
fragile and like an accordion the right of privacy is. For
social utitilities change, and insofar as the right of privacy is accorded to citizens in virtue of its social utility ,
the scope and very existence of this right will depend
upon its fluctuating social utility.
The point is nicely illustrated by a passing comment
in Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold.
The dissenting Justices, Black and Stewart, had argued
that the Court should not substitute its social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who
are elected by the people to pass laws. This restraint
should be exercised even when they pass a law like the
one at issue, which even Justice Stewart conceded was
"uncommonly silly." Justice Goldberg replied:
The vice of the dissenters' views is that it would permit such experimentation by the States in the area of
the fundamental personal rights of its citizens . . . .
The logic of the dissents would sanction federal or
state legislation that seems to me even more plainly
'4

unconstitutional than the statute before us. Surely the
Government, absent a showing of compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree that all husbands and wives must be sterilized after two children
have been born to them. Yet by their reasoning such
an invasion of marital privacy would not be subject
to constitutional challenge because, while it might be
'silly,' no provision of the Constitution specifically
prevents the Government from curtailing the marital
right to bear children and raise a family . While it may
shock some of my brethren that the Court today holds
that the Constitution protects the right of marital
privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe
that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complet~
variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon
a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is
valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring
compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid.
In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which
are constitutionally protected.
What is worth noting in this interesting argument is
the qualification Justice Goldberg slips in while raising the spectre of Big Brother stumbling int<;> the bedroom. Goldberg's argument is that "absent a showing of
compelling subordinating state interest " governmental
supervision of the marriage couch, whether to prohibit
or to promote the use of contraceptive devices, is unconstitutional. But if there were a "compelling state interest" in the regulation of (even) natural marital relations, it might well not be unconstitutional to outlaw
the use of contraceptives, or (conversely) the failure to
use them. Even marital privacy is thus not unconditional. Its value too is extrinsic, in spite of the fact that the
Court makes much of marital privacy's being a funda mental right. Fundamental, i.e., .non-fundamental, conditional, provisional, possibly temporary.
Now if, in the opinion of the Court, even the right of
marital privacy is subject to change and review, one
wonders what sense it makes to speak of the (legal)
Right of Privacy at all. If rights are the sorts of things
which come and go, depending upon the times and circumstances, and possibly within the career of the interpretation of a single document, then they are at
best rights in a very extended sense. They are enjoyed
only at the pleasure of the relevant law-making or lawinterpreting body. They certainly are not Constitutional rights, which must be honored upon pain of undercutting the very basis of the entire legal system. And
if this is true of the Right of Privacy - or even the much
more limited Right of Marital Privacy - it follows
that these rights are not legal rights in the full-blooded
sense of that term which we may once have fancied them
to be. They're here-today, possibly-gone-tomorrow
rights.
The Cresset

may not, for example, disrobe with impunity at a public
assembly (unless one is at a certified Rock Festival,
etc.); nor, in some States, can one legally attempt suicide. But for all of that, the Right of Privacy has seemed
to some courts to include the right to abort.

Priorities in the Body Politic
I do not wish to suggest that there is no "right" of
privacy, or that the notion of a Right of Privacy is unimportant or confused. On the contrary, it seems likely
that talk of the Right of Privacy is very much on the ascendancy, especially as we find it increasingly difficult to exercise that right. Now that the Supreme Court
has given some legitimacy to the general notion of a
Right of Privacy, we are already seeing the invocation
of this "right" in an effort to reform and abolish some
nettlesome laws.
For example, abortion laws are being attacked on the
ground that they violate a woman's Right of Privacy to
do as she wishes with her body. This is an intriguing
angle. It is far from clear that the law grants people
the right to do what they want with their bodies. One

What we see in the Right of Privacy is a novel legal
concept, doubtless responsive to a widespread popular
fancy, which is used by various legal institutions and
public advocates to come to terms with changing social
situations. The concept of a Right of Privacy, like any
concept, is a tool of thought about the world and man's
place in it. But this concept, unlike some others, has no
necessary applicability. Indeed, its recent legal birth
and now rampant use suggest that the belief that each
one of us has such a right is something of a conceit.
Provisional rights depend for their existence upon
priorities; in our quasi-democratic system of government, this means that whether we have a Right of Privacy depends upon our own priorities. Yet priorities,
like the social utilities which they reflect, have a way of
changing. If they do, and the Right of Privacy is discarded in the process, nothing intrinsically good will
be lost, though life would, in that event, be very different for us. Still, it's not so very good now, so what
lies ahead may well be better.

On Second Thought
A strange phenomenon is occurring with increasing frequency in the church: the use of monetary threat
to affect the course of congregational and denominational policy. Congregations enter what they call
a "status confessionis," they withhold their expected contributions from their denomination until such
time as its leaders act in accordance with th~ir will.
Church members withdraw support because the church
program is not what they desire. Church publications
are boycotted until the publishers respond to the will
of the protesters.
Each evidence has its converse. Leaders hire and
fire personnel to satisfy the protest so that monetary
support will continue. Publishers print in anxiety
over subscription lists only what will not damage their
income. Congregations act in order to keep the support of the "good giver."
One little word calls all of this into question. It was
spoken by Jesus Christ our Lord. He said, "You cannot serve God and mammon." You can argue about
the applicability of the word, but you cannot deny
its truth - not just because Jesus said it, but because
it is so obviously true. You cannot serve God and Mammon. Choose your leader: monetary need or God.
Arguments for the monetary threat are good. We
should not give to what is unGodly. The work of the
church needs contributions, and we cannot afford
September, 1970
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to endanger the whole program for one minor part.
Publishing is costly, and we can print only what will
be supported and used. The will of the people is, in
a real sense, the voice of the Spirit in the church and
we must listen.
Another little word used by Jesus Christ throws
all these arguments out. The word is "faith." If we
believe, we convince, exhort, and lead to change by
the Word in Jesus Christ. Money does not speak the
Word. If we believe, we trust in God as we do what
we are called to do. We do not trust in the wallets of
people. If we believe, we listen to the Spirit that speaks
Jesus Christ, not the voice that threatens money.
Churches who use the power of money to affect their
will are serving mamon and not God. They do not
act in faith, they do not speak the Word. Men who
alter or avoid what they feel called to do because of
monetary threat are serving mammon and not God.
They do not act in faith, they are not listening to the
Word.
The judgment is harsh, but not too harsh. There
is no condemnation in it. In the Christian ethos, when
we realize that we are judged we only realize that salvation and joy lie in another direction. The judgment
is only a call to deny the threat and the fear of money. It is a call to serve God in whom is our only hope.
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The Ethics of Population and Pollution
By STANLEY HAUERWAS
Department of Theology
University of Notre Dame

Before addressing myself directly to the ethical issues involved in the population-pollution problem, I
would like to make a few methodological comments
about the nature of ethical reflection on these kinds
of questions. This is necessary as many think of the
ethicist as a kind of moral legislator who determines
the right and wrong, the good and bad, of each issue. To
be an ethicist would seem to commit one to a claim of
moral wisdom and insight greater than that of most
men. Thus, the ethicist's job is conceived as be,·ng able
to dictate the non-ambiguous "ethical solution" for the
population-pollution issue.
As much as ethic£sts may be tempted to assume thJ"s
vaunted status we cannot do so for a least two reasons.
First, ethicists have no special knowledge about the
good that other men do not. There is no abstract good
to know, but the good comes clothed always in the garment of ambiguity. As such we are limited by the same
kJ"nd of painful human experience that besets all men.
Rather than recommending the "good" we simply try
to help men see what is at stake in the decisions that
we all have to make.
Secondly, there are no pure moral ,·ssues, but rather
they come mixed with extremely complex matters of
fact and interpretation. For example the issues of population and pollution depend for definition on a great
deal of expert knowledge of such people as demographers, ecologists, biologists and sociologists. As an ethicist I cannot pretend to be an expert in any of these
areas. I must simply accept a good deal of what -they
tell me in good faith.
I think there is a problem here as we must be careful
not to indulge in a glorification of the expert. This is
dangerous because experts disagree and we might easily make the error of enshrining bad science. More
important than this however is that such disagreement
among "objective" scientists often is the result of basic
value presuppositions that they have failed to make
explicit.
However this is meant only as a warning. I do not
mean to imply or suggest that the findings of scientists
are not extremely important for informing our moral
options. We must be willing to let new findings d1"rect
our ethical response. For at least part of the meaning
of the ,·dea of responsibility is trying as much as possible to know what is going on.l In as much as expert
opinion ,·nforms us of this it is of extreme moral importance.
Given these qualifications however I think that what
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an ethicist can do is to try to suggest a framework within
which the issues of population and pollution can be morally discussed with more rigor than otherwise might
be possible. The ethicist in a sense is not a man with
answers, but rather he is a man with certain questions
that he thinks are important to be asked. For in the asking of such questions he tries to delineate as clearly as
possible what morally is at stake in certain issues and in
so doing perhaps indicate what are some of the possi~le
alternative directions. Ethics is rather like art in this
as it is ultimately an attempt to clarify our vision through
conceptual stimulation of the imagination.

The Overpopulation of the Underdeveloped
I should like to begin by briefly indicating my understanding of the population and pollution issues so you
can see the kind of perception with which I am working.
This is important for one's ethical analysis of any problem depends to a great extent how and what one understands the problem to be - my understanding of it
might be wrong; therefore, it is important for me to
make clear exactly what I think is going on. In other
words what I am indicating is that the descriptive task
is not simple or non-moral, but an integral aspect of
any moral analysis.
First in regard to population I take the problem to
be the rapid growth of world population. Population
growth in the past has been checked by high death rates
balanced by high birth rates - as a.matter of fact the
latter was thought important as a way of maintaining
large families necessary for survival in agrarian economies. However with the advent of modern medicine,
control of plague, and better nutrition, to mention just
three reasons, the birth rate is now far exceeding the
death rate. Coupled with this is the phenomenon known
as the "doubling effect." It took until1850 for the world's
population to equal a billion. From 1850 to 1925 a second billion was added, and by 1960 a third billion was
added. We are expected to reach four billion by 1985.
This of course is but the concrete realization of Malthus' insight that population growth occurs in geometric proportion rather than arithmetic.
What is especially disturbing about this increase is
it is occurring in its most dramatic forms in underdeveloped countries where population already exceeds
food production. The upshot of this is that we can anticipate in the next fifty years mass starvation and sickness that results from malnutrition. Even Donald Bogue,
The Cresset

the most optimistic of the demographers, in arguing
that the population crisis will be over by the 21st century says that in countries such as India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, and Egypt there is no way to avoid mass
starvation. 2
Also intimately related to the question of population
beyond that of starvation is the human problems brought
on by population density - increases in tension, stress,
urbanization, and the question of whether our political forms can handle the problems arising from the
growth of population. In the light of this analysis many
are concluding that morally we must do something to
reduce the rapid growth of population. 3
The one issue that stands out among these kinds of
problems however is of course that of pollution. What
starvation is to an underdeveloped country pollution
is to the developed. Increased industrialization and
waste occasioned by our population growth is threatening our environment in a way that even if we are able
to feed ourselves we may not be able to survive. This
is not just a matter of destroying what natural surroundings we have left, but it is a question of the air we
breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink - we
are in effect poisoning ourselves by the very necessities of the prerequisites of living in a mass industrialized society. Therefore pollution and population go
hand in hand; we cannot effectively do anything about
the one without doing something about the other.
This is how I understand the situation descriptively
today. Such a description could be wrong, but I think
that the realm of proof now rests on those who would
argue to the contrary. Once the issue is put in this
stark way, however, the natural reaction of many is one
of shock and then a determined resolve that something
must be done about the coming crisis. The primary
assumption often behind this response is that survival
is the main value at stake and that all steps necessary
must be taken in order to reverse the current trend. It
is a corollary of this assumption that any means can be
justified in this situation in order to achieve the end of
reduced population growth.
For example there are only two ways to reduce population growth - increase the death rate or decrease
the birth rate. Most of those who assume that survival
is the one value presupposition involved in this question endorse some rather extreme and coercive ways of
controlling the birth rate. However they also often assume that it is appropriate to use certain techniques to
increase the death rate. They are, for example, impresed by the statistic that shows the most effective way to
institute a sudden and dramatic drop in the birth rate
is to resort to widespread abortion (and abortion is a
death increase strategy; it is not birth control).
In such a context abortion is simply viewed as a means
to a morally good end - no longer is the question of
abortion considered as an issue in itself, the question of
the viability of the fetus is often not even raised - it
September, 1970

is simply assumed that the already born have a claim to
life that is greater than that of the fetus.
However as this argument now stands one must ask
what prevents the same kind of reasoning from being
used as a justification for the destruction of all unwanted infants before they reach their first year. That way
we could separate the wheat from the chaff with greater
precision. Or given the logic of the argument one must
not ask why the proponents of abortion as a means to
solve the population crisis do not recommend that all
those over 65 be eliminated in the name of the good of
the whole. (Of course that is not efficient since they
are past the time of child rearing.)

Who is to Suffer for the Good of Us Alll
What I want to illustrate by these examples is that the
form of the argument that is often used to discuss the
population crisis is the classic utilitarian argument that
the good of the whole justifies and dictates the right
moral policy - and the good is identified by the quantitive satisfaction of the individual desires of the greatest number. But as soon as the argument is stated in
this abstract form we can ask some rather important
questions about it : (1) what is the content of such a
good; (2) who is to decide what such a good is; (3) who
is to suffer for the good of the whole; (4) and finally
are any means justified if the desired end is achieved.
As soon as such questions are raised it becomes clear
that the moral issues in the population-pollution crisis are more complex than simply the question of survival - that is they are more complex if we are interested in surviving as fully human beings - otherwise
we may simply be willing to survive at a cost of employing measures that would make us less than human. It
is to recognize that human life is not an end in itself if
it is divorced from the moral values that make human
life worthwhile.
Often when someone raises these kinds of questions
that challenge the reigning orthodoxy surrounding the
population issue the questioner is accused of being
more concerned with the quantity of life than the
quality. For example Robert Ardrey in a recent Life
article says, "The humanist preoccupation with the
numbers game has sacrificed human quality for human
quantity. Life must be prolonged, whatever agony it
presents to the dying. A child defective physically or
mentally must somehow be saved to join the breeding
population." He concludes "that we will find out one
day over-protection of human beings will produce a
genetic collapse in the most compassionate population."4
While I do not wish to attribute Ardrey's views to all
who follow this line of reasoning I do think that it makes
clear the logic of the position. But it must also be pointed out that contrary to Ardrey's assertion it is those who
adhere to the utilitarian argument that are concerned
with the numbers game as they assume that all men can
be treated as strict numerical entities to be added and sub7

tracted as inorganic units. It is not finally an issue of quantity versus quality, but rather differing interpretations
of the qualityoflife.
In this connection I must admit that I am a bit concerned how some understand "quality of life" in the
debate of the population issue in this country. For I
sometimes think that they are more concerned with
preserving a certain kind of middle class standard of
living than moral quality. This is probably an overstatement but we must be on our guard not to use the
population issue as a support for our own self-interest.
In this respect it is interesting to note that some black
Americans are extremely suspicious of the population
argument as they perceive it as a possible attempt at
genocide. 5 Moreover, much of the third world views
the attempts to regulate their birth rate as but a different
form of Western imperialism.
In the light of these questions I should like to suggest
that the moral issues raised by the population-pollution
crisis are best understood in relation to the dialectical
values of self-determination and community. 6 By selfdetermination I do not mean just the possibility that
men have to determine their futures through their
beliefs, intentions and choices. Such ability is of course
a prerequisite for the values of self-determination, but
it is not the normative principle itself. Normatively,
self-determination embodies those aspects of our moral
existence that allows us to determine, rather than be
determined by, the natural. This is the reason that the
value of self-determination is so basic in any consideration of human behavior. It is that aspect of our lives that
insures the possibility of human creativity and freedom
and thus human significance. Because we are self-determining we are able to form our lives in accordance
with our perceptions of good and right, which provides
the basis for our assumption that we can be held accountable for our beliefs, choices, and actions.
The value of self-determination is related to many
different kinds of our institutional behavior. For example, it is the primary value underlying the personal
nature of human sexuality and propagation. As humans we think it important that we claim certain rights
in regard to our responsibility for regulating our sexual
activity. In this sense it is also the value to which those
adhere who advocate birth control as they assume that
what it is to be a man is to shape rather than be shaped
by his sexual "nature."
But equally important for human behavior is the
value of community. Men cannot determine themselves
in a vacuum for the content of their self-determination
comes from their social groups. This is not just a recognition that men are basically social animals, but it is
also a normative prerequisite for significant human experience. To be human is to be other-regarding. It is
to recognize that our self-determination must be limited
in accordance with the rights of others.
8

Individuals in a Wider Ecological Community
This aspect of our moral being is institutionally and
concretely determined by sets of expectations that allow
us to be able to count on and trust the others. These
expectations can be thought of as boundaries over which
we cannot go if we are to maintain our existence together. Such boundaries of course can and do become
perverted to serve causes that are detrimental to the
human gTOup, but such perversions do not cancel the
I
basic significance of such sets of expectations. In this
respect however it is extremely important to denote the
kinds of communities to which we belong, for as men we
will be as limited as our most inclusive communities.
What is interesting of course about these two sets of
values is they are not necessarily consistent. Often the
value of self-determination is stressed to the extent it
is destructive of community; or human community can
be made so exclusive a value it results in the oppression
of human creativity. No abstract balancing of these two
values can solve the hard historical problem of striking
the proper balance between them as this must be worked
out in the contingencies of our concrete existence.
It seems to me that it is just this kind of problem that is balancing the values of self-determination and
community - that the population and pollution crisis
is occasioning. The central issue I think both are calling
forth is the question of community, for both force us to
ask if part of the cause behind this crisis is not due to
the fact that many of us have been working with too
narrow community loyalties. For example the issue of
pollution forces us to realize that our communities
cannot just be limited to our immediate families and
localities. It reveals that we are ecologically tied together in a network of interdependence. Unless we
recognize this and work for a genuinely common good,
a good that is not identified with each of our individual
satisfactions, then we may all have to live less wholesome and healthy lives.
In a way this problem reveals beautifully that if selfdetermination is to be sustained it depends on adherence to a community loyalty. We must communally decide to limit our individual potential as pollutants or
we will find that we have not gained more self-determination but less. In a sense this problem is calling us
to consider the importance of the idea of the common
good for the criterion of governmental action.
This is even more to the case in respect to the question
of population, for this problem is forcing us to see that
in reality, not just in ideality, we are in a community
with men everywhere. We in America cannot morally
afford to ignore this as a problem for all the world for
we are bound up with the destiny of the human community. In more personal terms this problem is forcing
us to see what has always been true about human sexuality, but what we have often ignored - that is that
procreative behavior is an individual and communal
right. Our sexuality is not an inherent right that cannot
The Cresset

be balanced by the demands of others - in fact if it is
to remain our right at all we must learn to limit it for
the good of the community.
Thus the population-pollution crisis does raise serious moral questions - but it is not alone the question
of survival, but rather it is the question of what kind of
human communities do we want to live in. It seems to
me that we would want such communities to at least
allow for the significance of men's self-determination as
it can be ordered to the common good. Society serves
as the enhancement of our self-determination not as
its defeat.
In this respect as we go about meeting the necessity
of reducing population growth we should place a premium on birth control rather than death enhancement.
This means I would favor if necessary extreme coercive
birth control measures before I would resort to abortion.
Moreover this means that we would try to use those
methods that would as much as possible preserve the
· voluntary nature of the propagative process. Thus the
importance and responsibility of becoming informed on
these issues is to be stressed.
Beyond information such steps the society can take to
encourage small families such as tax breaks should be
encouraged. Also better infant care should be stressed
(especially in underdeveloped countries) as a way of
making clear that large families are no longer a necessity. 7 It is important in this respect to understand the
wide range of possible ways to reduce population
growth as a way of increasing our ethical option.s
Each of the methods I have suggested above are de-

signed to encourage the growth of community responsibility, but the question arises what if there is not time
for voluntary family planning to work, as it would seem
already the case in some underdeveloped countries. 9 It
may be that more coercive techniques are necessary in
such situations, but if so they must be justified in terms
of the common good. Such coercive strategies should
be used as much as possible to enhance human freedom
and encourage responsible community behavior. For it
may well be that survival is the question at stake but
let us make sure we survive as humans - that is as men
who are free to determine themselves in accordance
with the need of the other.
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On March 5, 1970, President Nixon proclaimed the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) "The Law of the Land," following the ratifications of 43 states (including the United States, The
Soviet Union, and Great Britain) necessary to bring the
treaty into force. The President said that the coming
into force of the NPT was one of the major steps in
moving "from a period of confrontation to a period of
negotiation and a lasting peace .' ~ He also expressed
hope that the signing would bring about a reduction of
tensions among nations, tensions which have made armaments necessary.
This article seeks to summarize many of the arguments which have been advanced as to whether new
states should or should not develop independent nuclear weapons systems. While there appears to be some

September, 1970

basis for believing that the current international system
offers, on balance, a net incentive for such states not to
manufacture nuclear weapons, there also appears to be
little hope that nuclear proliferation can be stopped in
the absence of a United States - Soviet agreement to
reduce their own nuclear arsenals. The success of the
recent Non-Proliferation Treaty, then, depends greatly
upon the success of the current Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) between the superpowers in Vienna.
There is, unfortunately, reason to doubt that these talks
wt'll be effective.
During the months of February and March of this
year a number of statements by U.S. Government officials indicated certain inconsistencies in the Nixon Administration 's policies with respect to strategic arms
matters. The questions of nuclear non-proliferation,
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ballistic missile defenses, and more sophisticated "offensive " deterrent weapons such as the highly touted
multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles
(MIRV~) to be affixed to U.S. Minuteman missiles, are
of necessity interrelated. The present administration,
however, takes one point of view on the proliferation
problem and what amounts to a contradictory point of
view on the question of its own defensive and deterrent
forces. In brief, the administration expects other nations
to renounce nuclear weapons while at the same time
demonstrating to the world its own belief that they are
useful, even necessary, to protect our security.
In part, the dichotomy between these two policies is
not intentional, but is due to the fallacies in the logic
of nuclear deterrence strategies - which have guided
U.S. strategic thinking for over two decades. The importance of the inconsistencies cannot be overlooked,
however, particularly in light of the future prospects
of widespread nuclear proliferation . The United States
cannot continue on what appears to other nations to be
a hypocritical course in weapons development and
reasonably expect these countries to stand idly by without developing their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of responsible behavior by the present administration and by its Soviet counterpart at Vienna and
Helsinki, the vital need for a reduction and eventual
end to the dependence of states on weapons of mass
destruction for their security will go unrealized and
the initiative towards world security will fall to the
presently non-nuclear states.

Inconsistencies in American Nuclear Policy
The Preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states,
inter alia, that the states concluding the treaty express
. .. their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and
to undertake effective measures in the direction of
nuclear disarmament.
Two other clauses commit the signatory powers to the
"strengthening of trust between states in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear
weapons (and) the liquidation of all their existing
stockpiles ... pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament." It also reminds the states that:
In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, ... and that the establishment and maintenance
of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the
world's human and economic resources.
In seeming accord with the philosophy of the Nixon
administration to lessen East-West tensions with regard
to weapons development, Secretary of Defense Laird,
in a military posture statement to Congress on February
20, said that, "We have no irrevocable decisions on the
10

future composition of our strategic general purpose or
mobility forces." 2
In good Pentagonese, however,
Laird did say that while the Department of Defense
would put off firm decisions on big new weapons until
after the SALT, it considered an expanded missile defense system (ABM) "essential" in the meantime. He
did not elaborate on the logical distinction between
"essential," on the one hand, and "no irrevocable decision," on the other. Senate Armed Services Committee
Chairman John Stennis (D. Miss.) added, on the same
day, that the United States would not become a secondrate power if Congress could help it, an obvious warning to his fellow senators who would cut the Pentagon's
budget.
Five days later, on February 25, Secretary Laird asked
Congress to approve plans for a third Safeguard ABM
complex, for Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The
Secretary also sought Congressional authorization for
preparations, but not actual deployment of, Safeguard
ABM systems for four other vaguely defined areas, including Washington, D.C. The latter location is significant, since the Safeguard is designed to protect not
population centers, but hardened missile sites, indicata future function for a more widespread ABM system.
Laird explained that:
Given President Nixon's determination to postpone
additional actions on U.S. offensive (missile and bomber) systems this year in order to advance prospects
for success at SALT, further programs on Safeguard
deployment becomes the only viable course available.3
Apparently, to do nothing while awaiting the outcome
of the preliminary SALT negotiations would not have
been a viable course for the United States.
Indeed, Laird's understanding of the President's determination itself appears to have been faulty. On Wednesday, March 11, - not a week after the President had
signed the proclamation for the enforcement of the
NPT, and only two weeks after Laird's statement - it
was reported in the press that the l.Inited States would
deploy its first intercontinental missiles with multiple
warheads (MIRY's) in June, 1970.
Administration officials said . that although the
deployment date had been known within the government for some time, no proposals were made to President Nixon that he delay the date because of the
SALT talks. 4
The beginning of deployment of the missiles with multiple warheads would probably make even more difficult any Soviet-American agreement to keep the nuclear
arms race from entering a new phase. "But," it was
argued by some administration officials, "since no SALT
agreement is in sight and since the Soviet Union has
not slowed down its own arms development, the United
States must stick to its schedule ." 5
It first appeared that the MIRY's were a qualitative
advancement designed to maintain the U.S. counterforce strategy by getting more mileage out of the MinThe Cresset
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uteman missiles by simply replacing single warheads
with multiple ones, capable of being targeted against
the increasing number of Soviet ICBM's. Had this been
the case there would have been no significant change in
the U.S.'s "counter-force" deterrent strategy designed
to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos. It was revealed
two days later, however, that the American MIRV is
not a significant qualitative advancement over the
single-warhead Minuteman II, at least in terms of present U.S. strategy. Pentagon Spokesman Jerry Friedheim told newsmen that,
We do not have the capability (with the MIRV) to
attack hardened silos in the Soviet Union , and we do
not plan to acquire that capability. 6
This means that U.S. MIRY's must be targeted , in a
most threatening manner, against Soviet cities ; because
when the warheads are made small enough to fit into
the MIR V's, they are too small to destroy a hardened
weapon. Friedheim added that the Soviets are "very
close" to having the capability to destroy American
Minuteman sites.
These developments imply two things. First, it
appears to be the policy of the Defense Department to
use anti-ballistic missiles on an increasing scale as our
only counter-force weapon. Secondly, if the assessment
of Soviet capability is accurate, it would mean that the
whole MIRV program for Minuteman missiles borders
on being obsolete before it is deployed , since it is only
effective as a countercity weapon . Moreover, as a counter-city weapon, the MIRV would obviously be redundant - there cannot be over 1,000 viable soft targets in
the Soviet Union (the approximate number of American
Minuteman II's already deployed), to say nothing of
the some six hundred Polaris (and soon to be MIRVed
Posiedon) missiles cruising the oceans.
The most generous conclusion one can draw from
these strategems is that the administration was either
trying to confuse the Soviet Union or is seeking to attain a position of strength from which to enter SALT.
Very probably, it was trying to do both. But more important for pres-ent purposes, the statements of the President and his Secretary of Defense make the Preamble
to the NPT appear meaningless, or, at best, just so much
rhetoric, in the eyes of a potential nuclear power. The
announced decisions are almost completely antithetical
to the necessary rationale if a workable non-proliferation agreement is to be realized in the future . To understand why, it is necessary to delve more deeply into the
various arguments with respect to the spread of nuclear
weapons.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Catalytic War
The most fundamental motivation behind a state's
decision to acquire nuclear weapons would appear to
be to deter a particular military threat. Different aspects of this motivation surrounded the Americansponsored European Multi-Lateral (nuclear) Force
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(MLF) in the early 1960's. 9 The same rationale applies
equally to such diverse countries as Germany, in the
face of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union; Israel,
in the face of the circumferential threat from the Arab
countries supplied by the Soviet Union; and the government of mainland China, which may perceive a threat
either from the nationalist regime on Taiwan, backed
by American nuclear power. 10 or from the Soviet
Union on its northern border.
A natural corollary of the desire for enhanced security through the development of an independent nuclear
arsenal is the desire for increased freedom of action and
participation in decision making. 11 The desire for
freedom of action in the contemporary international
system (particularly for small power allies of the superpowers), however, is tied to the rationale of "catalytic
war." The catalytic-war rationale dictates that if a small
power can develop an infant nuclear force, it can
threaten to escalate any aggression it may suffer into a
nuclear exchange. By virtue of the danger this threat
presents to the alliance, and, thereby, to the superpower ally itself, this ally will be compelled to intervene
in the conflict - substituting its own, larger, deterrent
force for the small one of its partner - to prevent the
escalation from actually occurring.
The rationale of catalytic war shifts the initiative for
responding to aggression from the superpower to the
small power. As such, it could lead a major nuclear
power, such as the United States, into a conflict it would
otherwise have chosen to avoid. The major power,
therefore, has an interest in preventing the development of independent nuclear forces within its alliance.
Its principal justification for this tactic is that small
power deterrent independence can never be complete.
Despite the argument often made, for example, by the
French, that an independent nuclear force is meant
solely as a "minimum deterrent" in case the American
deterrent in Europe loses its credibility,I2 American
strategists have emphasized that the proliferating
power would always be dependent on the support of the
great power deterrent.J3
The Franco-American controversy over the efficacy
of independent nuclear deterrents is characteristic of
the destabilizing effect nuclear proliferation may have
on an alliance. Despite the opinion of some analysts
that independent nuclear forces would not be destabilizing,14 these arguments have not been able to stand
up under either theoretical or historical analysis. Professor Oscar Morgenstern has argued, for example, that
independent control of nuclear weapons given only to
certain allies would invariably create dissension within
the blocY' Albert Wohlstetter has observed that while
there might be certain political benefits from independent nuclear forces (in terms of national feelings
of independence and self-determination) which might
outweigh the political liabilities of increased dissension,
even these benefits could not be divorced from the dangerous military implications of such forces (a weaken11

ing of the American deterrent) which, itself, would work
to the detriment of the alliance.J6
A compelling addition to these arguments is made by
Professor Raymond Aron in his assessment of the folly
of the French program. Aron's basic premise is that
deterrent strategies must, of necessity, progress beyond
the irrationality of the threat of massive retaliation (i.e.,
"minimum deterrence") in response to limited aggression. Such strategies must further consider a feasible
"strategy of use" of those weapons if deterrence should
failP In the French case, for example, because of the
ability of the Soviet aggressor to determine the level of
conflict, an effective deterrent strategy would imply
not only the ability to fight a limited war of defense
against a conventional attack, but also the attainment of
invulnerability of one's strategic forces to insure that
his weapons are not destroyed in a preemptive strike.
The deterrent requirements of the 1960's, which Aron
describes, were largely brought about by new weapons
technologies, and these also had an effect on the stability of relationships within alliances. Independent deterrent arguments appeared during the 1961 shift in the
American strategic doctrine toward NATO, which gave
increased importance to non-nuclear forces for the
initial defense of Western Europe. U.S. strategists argued that, given the invulnerability of the American
strategic nuclear force, it would be highly unlikely for
the Soviet Union to launch an initial strike against any
European ally of the United States for fear of immediate
American retaliation. Rather, the so-called McNamara
Strategy reasoned that what was to be feared was a small
border incursion which would not justify a response
with nuclear weapons.JB Conventional forces were to
be used to combat such aggression, keeping the nuclear
arsenal "flexible" - to be resorted to if the conflict was
escalated beyond its original limits. This strategy, however, required American superiority both at the conventional and at the nuclear level - illustrating the
growing relationship between deterrent and defensive
strategies.

The Defense of the Small Powers:
The Dilemma of the Superpowers
Professor John Erickson notes that the Kennedy Administration became aware of the limits of an "unlimited" reliance on nuclear weapons for the security of
Western Europe immediately upon taking office. Its
strategy of "flexible response" brought about the obsolescence of the French force de frappe even before it
was developed. The American recourse to the conventional "shield," in its deterrence theory, however,
brought about a crisis of confidence in the European
capitals over the credibility of the American deterrent
- which, in turn, led to an overreaction on the part of
the European policy makers, i.e., the French, to manufacture their own, already useless, deterrent forces.l 9
The relationship between deterrence and defense
becomes most apparent when one looks at the defense

12

needs of states which are parties to sub-bipolar conflicts. Many of these states face a serious dilemma. On
the one hand, an increase in one's military capability
to enhance its security has long been the prerogative of
all states. An advance to the nuclear level may be justified as simply another step towards such a posture. On
the other hand, if a level of stability exists at the nonnuclear level, there would appear to be no real reason
for assuming the costs of a nuclear weapons development program. Moreover, looking beyond the immediate advantages of attaining a nuclear striking force
before one's enemies achieve it, there appears to be
little doubt that, in circumstances of already tenuous
stability at sub-bipolar levels, acquisition by one potential belligerant would almost inevitably lead to acquisition by its immediate enemy, with little or no net
increase in security.20
For a small state to gain any security at all from nuclear weapons it would either have to use the weapons
preemptively or embark upon a costly program of attaining invulnerability. In the case of the more emotional and psychological conflicts at the sub-bipolar
level, even apart from preemptive strikes, there is the
danger of rapid escalation of border conflicts to nuclear exchanges.21 But there is an even more compelling argument against proliferation in these types of circumstances. It is based on the contemporary military
fact that credible nuclear deterrents are invariably linked with the ability of the deterring power to carry on
conventional wars while maintaining the option to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in the face of extreme threats to national survival.
This is the same argument that was used to show the
relative uselessness of independent deterrents in alliance situations. The examples of countries faced with
localized conflicts which do not directly involve either
of the superpowers (and, therefore, for whom independent deterrents would appear to be rational choices)
does not invalidate this principle. The reason for this
is that in the contemporary latent bipolar international
system, any conflict which threatens to escalate into
nuclear war tends to involve the superpowers. Naturally, the degree of involvement may vary with the crisis
at hand. But it is undeniable that each superpower is
intimately concerned with preventing the explosion of
crises which, directly or indirectly, through its adversary's opportunity to exploit the crisis, affects its
interests.
Moreover, the current concern with nuclear proliferation itself in Moscow and Washington, as expressed in the 1970 Treaty, would make the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by a sixth or seventh country an object of concern to both duopolists. Ultimately, if the
threat of even localized nuclear war is an object of concern to the present nuclear powers, hostilities themselves would certainly be of even greater concern, and
would undoubtedly lead to political, if not military,
intervention .
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The intervention of either the United States or the
Soviet Union in a crisis potentially involving the use of
nuclear weapons would, at first, most probably be at the
level of conventional weapons - given the risks of retaliation by the other superpower should the conflict
polarize. Should the off-chance arise where nuclear weapons would be used preemptively by one of the duopolists against a minor nuclear power, its recently acquired "independent deterrent" would be of no further
concern to the international system, which would be
faced with either a fait accompli or a major nuclear war.
The prospect of intervention, then, on a conventional
level, automatically places severe restraints upon countries seeking a purely "defensive" nuclear force. As was
noted above, it is in the nature of the contemporary system that such forces cannot be entirely "independent."
It is with these conditions in mind that national nuclear
forces, whether designed to be solely deterrent or solely
defensive, must be evaluated. Given superpower strategies designed to fight both conventional wars and
nuclear wars, and given the restraints upon deterrence
strategies imposed by the invulnerability of superpower nuclear forces, small power nuclear deterrents
cannot avoid calculating the effects of their deterrent
forces on ultimate strategies to use these weapons should
hostilities breaJ<. out. The inescapable link between
"deterrent strategies" and "strategies of use" (i.e., for
defense against aggression or for preemptive use) must
be a major consideration in national calculations of the
nuclear option.
The dilemma of the superpowers, in seeing nuclear
weapons dispersed to potential local belligerents, is
most easily seen in the hypothetical situation of a small
power capable of putting the former in a position where
the great power would have to carry out a suicidal policy
it would obviously have otherwise avoided. This is the
most fundamental reason that the United States and the
Soviet Union have come to agreement on the 1970 NonProliferation Treaty. It will become evident, however,
that this very rationale is, paradoxically, what is most
solidly standing in the way of a truly effective agreement on non-proliferation.

The Nuclear Club: Prestige and Priorities
For most potential nuclear powers, the option to develop national nuclear arsenals will not be decided
solely on the basis of deterrence and defense strategies.
Indeed, the fore-going analysis indicates that basing a
decision to acquire nuclear weapons on the basis of military needs would, in most cases, be a highly questionable
undertaking - raising at least as many problems as
the new forces were designed to solve. It is, therefore,
pertinent to note that there are other motives for the
development of national nuclear forces, among the most
important of which is the national desire for prestige.
Prestige has at least two sub-categories in the contemporary international system. On the one hand, it is reSeptember, 1970

lated to the strength and influence of the superpowers,
and, moreover, their pretensions to strength and influence. This force has been manifested in both the attitudes of France (with respect to American influence in
the Western Alliance) and China (vis a vis Soviet control over international communism). 22 On the other
hand, at the sub-bipolar level, questions of national
prestige are raised if and when past or potential antagonists acquire nuclear weapons. Alastair Buchan cites
particularly the cases of Japan vis a vis China, West
Germany with respect to French forces, and the major
neutral powers, Sweden, Switzerland, and India - the
latter with respect to China.
Of the arguments against the proliferation of nuclear
weapons from a political standpoint, one of the most
important is the danger of a new uncertainty in the international system; an uncertainty grown so dangerous
as to threaten hopes for a universal system of order. 23
Another aspect of this argument is the difficulty a large
number of nuclear powers would bring to the management of crises. In the event of hostilities, concurrent
great-power action may come too late, or not at all.2 4
Moreover, it seems valid to assert that the "nuclear
club" appears, tentatively, to have stabilized at five.
Acquisition by any one power would act as a break in
restraint which could lead from the sixth to the sixteenth
nuclear power within a matter of a few years, as nations
sought to keep up with their neighbors.2 5
Arguments concerning the destabilizing effects of
nuclear proliferation are, however, based on the
assumption that the world in which we live is, in fact,
stabilized by the Soviet-American duopoly of control
over the truly sophisticated nuclear weapons. Such
arguments are opposed by the simple fact that not all
countries agree that events are any longer in full control
of the two superpowers - if they ever were - and,
moreover, if they were, they should be no longer. The
most obvious countries holding this view are China,
with respect to the Soviet Union; France, with respect
to the United States; and India and Japan, with respect
to both the USSR and the United States, as well as to
China.
It would, indeed, appear that the Soviet Union and
the United States are wholly inconsistent in their policies. On the one hand they oppose nuclear proliferation,
but, on the other, they continue to sell conventional
armamants to a variety of countries, thereby supporting
belligerency. Equally as important, and perhaps the
most crucial contradiction of all, is the reliance of the
superpowers on their deterrent forces as sources of
security and stability. This cannot but appear to other
countries seeking greater security that both the United
States and the Soviet Union "protest too much." They
cannot have it both ways. They talk out of both sides of
their mouths when they argue that nuclear proliferation
would be destabilizing to the international system at no
net gain in security for any country, and then go ahead
and increase their own nuclear forces, ostensibly to pre-
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serve their own tenuous security but, in fact, increasing
their military and technological superiority over all
other nations.

The Criterion of Wisdom: The Negative Ideal
Perhaps the most significant answer to this widening
technological and credibility gap, in terms of the political ordering of the international system, is the necessity
for a change in national priorities. Minimally, this
means moderating the ever increasing reliance upon
military weapons for the acquisition of influence and
power in future international systems. The way to this
reordering of priorities must be led by the non-nucleararmed states.
There are two aspects to this argument. First, the acquisition of nuclear weapons means foregoing the option of acquiring them at some future time if certain
conditions are not met. It means giving up a not insignificant bargaining position. If the great powers (and ,
perhaps, eventually also France and China) perceive the
dangers to international stability from nuclear proliferation, they should be willing to pay some price for preventing it from happening. This price would now appear
to be larger than the one which a new, weak, nucleararmed state could extract under the guise of a new
"nuclear threat." Unfortunately, for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signing such an agreement now, without
adequate political compensation, would also effectively
neutralize the maintenance of this future option.
Secondly, there currently exists a certain amount of
prestige with the underdeveloped countries of the world
from standing opposed by example to the further spread
of nuclear weapons. 26 This stature must be cultivated
by the United States and the Soviet Union, whether it
is accompanied by a signature on the Treaty or not.
The present level of the development of highly
sophisticated nuclear weapons points the way to the principle that self-restraint is the criterion of wisdom in
foreign policy. Future developments in the field of nuclear weapons acquisition could bring the emerging
stability of the international system crashing down
around the heads of those who, themselves, are seeking
only greater security and influence. The most obvious,
albeit the most neglected, reason for this state of affairs
is that statesmen tend to deal in the short run with what
they consider to be political reality . They might be
better advised to deal in terms of the long-run effects
of their actions on the perceptions of their neighbors.
International politics is that form of politics which
best illustrates the predominance of particular (national) interests over what must be referred to vaguely as
the more general interest of the emerging international
community. Rousseau's famous "Essay on Inequality"
is not read with a view to mankind as a whole. At least
not yet.
There do exist enough self-interested reasons for
states to forego further nuclear proliferation. The reliance of the great powers on nuclear deterrence, and
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the consequent tendency for small-power leaders to
emulate this reliance (often for quite pristine reasons
associated with national security and prestige) threatens
to compromise the hopes for non-proliferation. It would
appear, therefore, that the negative ideal - based on
the horror of the weapons themselves and their possible
use - must become the authoritative legitimating principle, tying together the many motivations small nations
must have to forego nuclear weapons for any reason .
Such a responsibility falls to the non-nuclear powers
in the face of the abdication of responsibility by the superpowers. 27
The conflict between absolute principle and strategic
necessity can be resolved in perhaps no other way. 2s
1.
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Antioch, Athens, and the Age of Aquarius
By JAMES LIMBURG
Chairman, Department of Religion
Augustana College
Sioux Falls, South Dakota

I came home from teaching my Greek class a couple
of weeks ago to encounter our six-year-old son gyrating through the house and singing,
0 say can you see
my eyes,
If you can,
then m' hair's too short.
When I stopped him to ask what perverted mind of the
local playground had cooked that one up, I was patronizingly informed that the lines are from Hair. Whereupon our eleven-year-old daughter took me by the
hand, led me to the phonograph, and called my attention to the opening words of that musical,
When the moon is in the seventh house
and Jupiter aligns with Mars,
Then peace will guide the planets,
and love will steer the stars ...
and to the refrain line, "This is the dawning of the Age
of Aquarius ... "
It thus appears, as every six-year-old knows, that the
Age of Aquarius is upon us. And as part of a "Free University" assignment on our campus I have been listening to current folk, rock, and otherwise popular music
with the long-haired, transistor-toting citizens of the
Aquarian Age. I have heard them debate the meaning
of a line from Simon and Garfunkel's "Bridge over
Troubled Waters" (Columbia, 4-45079) with the passion
of a convention of orthodox rabbis or medieval alle~orical exegetes. I've listened to them speak of the
great Aquarian values, peace and love, with an eloquence echoing a Martin Luther King or the apostle
Paul. And as I wondered about the matter of communicating the Gospel to these children of the Age of Aquarius, it seemed to me that there are some authoritative
directives to be found by comparing the way Paul
preached in Antioch with the way he spoke in Athens,
as reported in the 13th and the 17th chapters of Acts.
I

The reader will recall that Paul and his company arrived in Antioch of Pisidia during the course of their
first missionary journey. When they attended the local
synagogue on the Sabbath, Paul was asked to appear as
guest preacher.
His audience was made up of Jews and of Gentiles
sympathetic to the Jewish tradition, called "God-fearers" (Acts 13:16, 26). In addressing this group, Paul
began by recalling the mighty acts of God on behalf of
Israel (13:17-22), continued by announcing the arrival
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of Jesus, the Saviour and Davidic King (23-37), and concluded with an announcement of the availability of
forgiveness and a new kind of freedom because of this
Jesus (38-41). Throughout this Antioch synagogue sermon, Paul made generous use of direct quotations from
the Scriptures (13:33-35, 41) and frequently alluded to
the biblical tradition.
If we take this report as typical of Paul's synagogue
preaching, we might observe that when Paul addressed
those steeped in the Jewish and Scriptural tradition,
he spoke in a very traditional manner.

II
The reader will also remember that as a result of
contacts made in the Athenian market place during the
course of his second missionary journey, Paul received
an invitation to address the Council of the Areopagus
(Acts 17: 16ff.). The setting for this speech was not a
synagogue, but rather the open air of Athens, with the
monuments of the Golden Age of Greece in full view.
And the audience was not made up of those carrying a
built-in bias toward the Jewish tradition, but rather
of Stoics, Epicureans and perhaps a searching agnostic
or two, who shared the spirit of the nameless Athenian
who had chipped out that altar "to an unknown (agnosto)
god" which furnished Paul with his jumping-off point.
If the setting in Athens was quite different from that
in Antioch, so was the speech. Taking a remarkably
open view toward the theological background of his
hearers, Paul began by saying, "Men of Athens, I perceive that in every way you are very religious." He
did not recite the mighty acts of God, but rather spoke
of God the Creator, a point on which most of his audience could agree (17:24-27a). He continued by affirming
the continued concern of God for his creation, and
supported his point by quoting from the Greek poets
(17 :27b-28 ). Especially surprising is Paul's reticence
in speaking about Jesus. He does not even mention him
by name, but only at the end of his speech makes mention of "a man" who had been raised from the dead and
who would judge the world.
III
But what have Antioch and Athens to do with the Age
of Aquarius? I suggest that the audience we encounter
in the youthful Aquarians is not at all Antiochene, but
rather quite Athenian.
Like those men of Athens, they are "very religious."
As evidence for this assertion we may follow Paul'
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precedent and cite some of their poets, more specifically the lyrics of some of the songs the Aquarians
listen to.
One discovers a certain fascination with the figure
of Jesus in these songs. I remember the surprise that
came with hearing lines reminiscent of "Jesus loves me"
from the Sunday Schools interjected into the very
swinging and sophisticated world of The Graduate a
few years ago. Simon and Garfunkel's mock toast to
Mrs. Robinson announced:
And here's to you, Mrs. Robinson,
Jesus loves you more than you will know ,
(Wo, wo, wo ... ) (Bookends, Columbia, KCS9529)
The trend has continued. A favorite with the Aquarians is Leonard Cohen's song, "Suzanne" (Judy Collins,
In My L1je, Elektra, EKS74027). The second verse gives
Jesus a title not to be found in the New Testament:
And Jesus was a Sailor,
when he walked upon the water,
And he spent a long time watching
from a lonely wooden tower ...
The number one record in our midwestern area last
spring was a Jesus-song, written by Holler and Abbott
and entitled, "Natural Man" (Hank Cardell, Laurie,
LR-3530). The refrain portrays a manly, thoroughly
non-docetic Jesus, with marked Aquarian features ;
Didn't he wear some dirty brown hair,
And a beard all matted down?
Handsome and tan, but a natural man
And his sandals scrapin' the ground.
Of special theological interest is an intense, driving
rock number by Webber and Rice , entitled "Superstar"
(Murray Head and The Trinidad Singers, Decca
732603). The Aquarian honorific epithet "Superstar"
is placed upon Jesus and the refrain raises the question
of Messianic consciousness:
You'd have managed better if you'd had it planned,
Why'd you choose such a backward time and
such a strange land ?
If you'd come today you would have reached a
whole nation
Israel 4 B.C. had no mass communication ...
Jesus Christ, Superstar, Do you think you're
what they say you are?
But the songs of the Aquarians do not focus on Jesus
to the exclusion of God, in the manner of the "death
of God" theologies. In fact, there is an explicit reaction
against the "death of God " slogan in Leonard Cohen's
"God is alive, magic is afoot" (Buffy Sainte-Marie,
Illuminations, Vanguard VSD79300):
God never sickened,
many poor men lied,
many sick men lied.
Magic never weakened
magic never hid ,
magic always ruled .
God is afoot,
God never died ... the heart did not believe.
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The same reaction again appears in Peter, Paul and
Mary's "Hymn" (Late Again, Warner Brothers, WS
1751):
Passing conversations where they mentioned
your existence,
And the fact that you had been replaced by
your assistants.
The discussion was theology and when they smiled
and turned to me,
All that I could say was "I believe in you ... "
If we ask what view of man informs the songs the
Aquarians listen to, we sense a certain kinship with that
audience in Athens. What could be more Stoic than the
lines from Simon and Garfunkel 's, "I am a Rock"
(Sounds of Silence, Columbia CS9269):
I am a rock, I am an island ...
I have no need of friendship,
friendship causes pain.
It's laughter and it's loving I disdain,
I am a rock , I am an island ...
And the spirit of a brand of popular Epicureanism is
is reflected in the refrain of Leiber and Stoller's recent
"Is that all there is?" as recorded by Peggy Lee (Capitol ,
2602). After confessing disappointment in the best that
life has to offer, the refrain declares:
If that's all there is my friends ,
then let's keep dancing,
let's bring out the booze and have a ball,
if that's all there is.
One senses a certain similarity between the reverent
agnosticism in the inscription "to an unknown God "
and another line from "Superstar":
Don't you get me wrong,
I only want to know ,
Jesus Christ. .. who are you?
The Aquarians are also more Athenian than Antiochene in that a great number of them lack any positive relationship to the institutions of the JudaeoChristian tradition. In good Pauline fashion I cite an
inscription, which may be taken as typical of the attitude of many toward the institutional church. On the
basement wall of our campus coffee house someone has
sketched a noble Viking, complete with spear and
horned helmet, the symbol of our Norwegian-Lutheran
heritage. Below it is written, "We have come to rape,
loot, and build a Lutheran church." Now whatever the
story behind that bit of graffiti, it reflects something
less than a positive attitude toward Lutherans, the church
in general, or both. And rather than dismiss that criticism as insignificant, one ought to recall the lines
from Simon and Garfunkel's "Sounds of Silence," about
the "words of the prophets ... written on the subway
walls, tenement halls." (Sounds of Silence)
Finally, it appears to me that like the Athenian audience, many of the Aquarian people are quite uninformed about the fundamentals of the Christian faith. The
Athenians simply had not been exposed to the Christian ti"adition; the Aquarians have often been overThe Cresset

exposed to a distortion of that tradition, and have accordingly become disinterested in doctrine, which they
dismiss as irrelevant.

IV
If it is true that there is certain congruence between
the Aquarian and Athenian audiences, then it may be
that those of us engaged in preaching and teaching the
Gospel in the Age of Aquarius can learn something from
the way in which Paul approached that task in Athens.
Paul began by calling the Athenians, with whom he
certainly had some theological differences, "very religious." I suggest that we begin by affirming the religious spirit of the Aquarius people. Can we not recognize in their Jesus-songs a powerful Vergegenwaertigung
of Christian tradition, reaching right into the midst of
the life of a whole generation, via guitar, eight-track
stereo cartridge, and automobile radio? Can we not
discern in their musical portraits of an Eleanor Rigby,
a Richard Cory, or a "most peculiar man" a sense of
loneliness and alienation, a quest for meaning, even
a longing for the "unknown god" whom the Aquarian
heart refuses to bury? And is not the desire to give oneself as a "bridge over troubled waters" consonant with
the life-style of the One who hung from a "lonely wooden tower"?
When the Aquarians see the institutional church as
shot through with phoniness, perhaps we can stop defending it for awhile and start listening to their criticisms. The best setting for such a listening, of course,
is within the institutions themselves, and I suggest that
every youth worker, high school Sunday School teacher,
and maybe even some professors in church colleges

quit telling it like they think it is for a time and begin
a serious listening for the reasons why so many Aquarians say that the church service "makes me nervous,"
to cite Simon and Garfunkel a final time ("Blessed,"
Sounds of Silence).
And we may be well advised to go a bit easy on indoctrination with these Aquarians. I am amazed at how Paul,
who was certainly a Christ-intoxicated man, could deliver a major speech without mentioning . the name of
Jesus Christ. With his Athenian audience, he began by
telling of God the Creator. And with the anti-church
Aquarians, who are concerned not only about peace
and love, but also about pollution, could we not find
a place to begin by rediscovering the biblical themes of
God the Creator and man the responsible steward?

v
All of this does not mean that we sacrifice the faith
we have inherited at the altar of the god of relevance.
Though Paul's speech in Athens sounded quite different from the sermon he preached in Antioch, both efforts were informed by the same theology. The theme
of "prophecies fulfilled" so dominant in the synagogue
sermon finds expression in the "but now ... "of the speech
in Athens (Acts 17 :30), and on both occasions the call to
"repent" is heard. And that which informs our preaching and teaching remains the Gospel of salvation through
Christ. But like the old Wrigley's gum slogan, "We
couldn't improve the product, so we improved the wrapper," the wrapping for that Gospel continually needs
to be contemporized and adjusted to fit the situation.
And if Paul didn't preach an Antioch-style sermon in
Athens, neither should we, in addressing the children
of the Age of Aquarius.

Music

'7o Arms!" 'Who Me?"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B y WILLIAM F. EIFRIO, JR.

The times are bad. But you didn't need to read this
column to be apprized of that. Did you know, though,
that the musical world is not exempt from the general malaise? The existence of symphony orchestras
is threatened by rising costs. Opera companies can
scarcely bring ends within sight of each other let alone
make them meet. It's the fault of rock music, of course.
Audiences have been seduced away from the edifying styles of serious music. The young man who aspires to a career as a violist or English horn player
had better get him to Memphis and develop a smooth
technique on electric guitar as a sideline. And now
Newsweek cries of a "Classical-Record Crisis" (August 10, 1970). Where will it all end?
While pop-record sales increased 400% the sale of
classical records fell 50% - and is still falling, we are
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told. "Falling sales percentages reflect the story of
youth turned off by the concert hall's irrelevance,
a shrinking number of serious-record stores, a union
that has almost priced orchestras out of the market,
radio stations dominated by pop releases, a recordbuying public that only responds to a few glittering
names, a repertory glutted by old war-horses." Only the New York Philharmonic and the Philadelphia
Orchestra still record for American companies. The
others have contracts with European studios, if they
have them at all. Even these foreign companies find
it necessary to couple American orchestras with wellknown names from their "stable of conductors" in
order to give some "sex appeal." "We've come to the
end of an era," says one recording director. The future
of classical music will have to be different. RCA, fol17

lowing the lead of less prestigious labels, figures that
future will mean "getting across to the kids." Beethoven's Ninth is now packaged in a cover featuring a
photograph of Woodstock. The amount of exposed
flesh on record jackets (and it's not classical statuary
either) suggests that "the kids" will be able to bring
into their living rooms what heretofore they have
furtively eyed on the racks of drug store literature.
We are informed: "There exists a prim;:tl apathy
toward classical music in America." "In 1970 the public seems to be absorbing less and less of anything
classical." Oh, we're in trouble, my friend. Get your
helmet (Wagnerian or Italian according to your preference) and meet me in the trenches.
Hold on a minute, though. Before I take up arms,
I want to be sure I recognize the enemy.
Every time I am in a Chicago concert hall or the
opera house, there are very few vacant seats. l know
the costs of maintaining subscription series are rising; perhaps the union is in part to blame. One pays
for what one thinks important enough, though, and
there seems to be individuals as well as corporations
and foundations that will pay for the support of serious musical enterprises. The number of young aspirants in the professional arena as far as I can see is
no less than before and they calculate the hard facts
coolly.
So why assume battle positions? This "crisis" is fashionably based on a silly premise, namely, that "classical" and "pops" are enemies and that the salvation
of great art requires a demonstration that just as many

people are for one side as support the other. (Is there
somebody out there working on a rebuttal to the great
American fallacy of establishing worth by majority
vote?) Serious music by its nature will appeal to only
a small part of the population. Only as heirs of a romantic educational vision do we attempt to place Plato
on every bookshelf, Michelangelo on every wall, and
Bach on every phonograph.
If record sales have fallen off, perhaps it is a sign
that an era of cultural hypocrisy is wearing off. More
probably it is the result of normal economic processes: too many producing too much for the market. Recall the record catalogues of the Forties. How glad
we were to get a few staples in automatic sequence.
The LP catalogue is a surfeit of pleasures by comparison. Or cast your mind back further. My uncle's Victrola collection contained McCormick singing "The
Rose of Tralee" as well as "Il mio tseoro." It's my impression that those high-standing cabinets with the
crank handle contained as much Whiteman as Wagner.
No, gentlemen, I'm not going to fight your war.
I've got my symphony tickets for this year; I'll support the efforts of good people to sustain serious musical opportunities; but you'll have to get yourselves
out of the financial bind. If most of your buyers invest their money in the fleeting pleasures of the latest hit, do not on that basis predict the end for those
of us who make our investments differently. Even
if you should leave us with our current collections,
we will still make the music we like best. We don't
mind being a statistical minority.

The Theatre

Letter From Abroad I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------By WALTER SORELL

It is one of the saddest experiences to see one's idols
fall from their pedestals. Before leaving New York
for London I saw Jean-Louis Barrault's production
of Rabelais, and now I wish I would have missed it.
When Barrault staged Claudel's Colombe many years
ago he created a beautiful image of total theatre at
its best within the framework of theatrical tradition.
With Rabelais Barrault jumped on the bandwagon
of the latest structureless, spontaneous, movementoriented theatre. It was total theatre, but it fell apart.
Some of its parts, loosely scattered around, were not
without interest but never quite came together on
the proscenium stage of the City Center.
The contemporary nontheatre is a dangerous trap
for a great artist like Barrault. He is musical and movement is second nature to him, but his primary, propelling force has always been the word. The amateurs,
however, of whom there are so many in our modern
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non-theatre and for whom charlatanism is second
nature, do not fall into any trap since they already
are the trap.
There could have been no better prelude to my
journey to London than to experience the grim farce
What the Butler Saw by the late Joe Orton, produced
at the Rooftop Theatre of the McAlpin Hotel. Even
though Orton died before giving this play its final
version, it is a minor masterpiece of a genre which
is very much Orton's sole creation: The "whodunit" story in a Feydeau style with the scintilling dialogue
of an Oscar Wilde. The theatrical events are highly
improbable and, as a matter of fact, the entire plot idea
pictures reality upside down. Yet the flow of the action
is so fast in its farcical wit and the connotations of what
the nonexistent butler sees are of such mordant significance that this frothy concoction turns into a tour de
force.
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Such a play must be staged with great style and verve.
The acting must be perfect, the performers must be
able to give each phrase the meaning it has while seemingly throwing the points away nonchalantly. The
New York production did not live up to the play's
challenge as the London production did last season.
There are very few actors left even in London who
can still do justice to Oscar Wilde, let alone Wilde
with Feydeauesque sassiness. Most of New York acting is on a fair or highly acceptable level. But spending only a week in London's theatres makes one aware
of how a fine acting tradition - which we lack - can
create an atmosphere of mystery without which there
is no really great art.
If this acting tradition would need any special proof,
the National Theatre brought it about with its latest
production of The Merchant of Venice in which Sir
Laurence Olivier appeared as Shylock. Kenneth Tynan once described Olivier on stage as a tiger unleashed in the arena, and two seasons ago he gave the Captain in Strindberg's The Dance of Death a ferocious
intensity. Olivier has not played Shylock since his
student days. Apparently he was not interested in
just giving the Elizabethan image of Shylock the touch
of his personality. The Renaissance conception of
Jews as usurers who eat no pork and stroke red beards
was not sufficiently enticing to him.
Jonathan Miller, the director, placed the play in
a late Victorian Venetian setting. The people, however, have the bearing of Londoners who never make
you forget that England conquered the sea and the
greater part of the world. The entire atmosphere is
that of imperialistic power gained by adventurous
merchants, of social arrogance and a fin de siecle decadence. Dandies stroll through the streets, sit in coffee houses, let their fortunes gamble with the fortunes
of others.
In this gloved and tophatted world Shylock is the
product of his time, indistinguishable from the gentile gents. He dresses like them. He hides his skullcap beneath his topper. His awareness of being useful, and therefore tolerated, is covered by a differ. ent arrogance. It is the certainty of being smarter,
more interested and informed. He is a distant cousin of the Rothchilds. He has dignity and is particularly careful of his speech pattern. He gestures with

restrained intensity when emotionally upset but has
none of the mannerisms of the mythical Jew. He is
too clean-shaven for that. He strangles his ancestral
vestiges in a soundless laugh. Only when realizing
his total defeat at the end of the trial scene does he
gradually loses his stiff upper lip. He leaves the scene
like a beaten dog. Then, backstage with Tubal, centuries of ghetto life and persecution are telescoped
into one wailing sound. Those who have heard Olivier's wail will never forget it. It is a desperate, piercing, growing and fading sound as if the Wailing Wall
would want to echo at once all it has ever heard.
Not all the actors are equally memorable, but all
are of one great ensemble. If my memory does not
trick me, Katharine Hepburn's Portia impressed me
more than Joan Plowright's. But she was asked to play
a different Portia, not a charming heroine with superior intellect and some cunning, but a suffragette
with law degree and a somewhat militant attitude
towards the male. The entire trial scene is conducted in a businesslike manner as if the members of the
board wished to oust and punish a black sheep.
The director tried to give the casket scene more
power with the help of an interlude of two singers,
with an eye-rolling black Prince of Morocco coming
directly from a minstrel show, and with a senile Prince
of Aragon. At the end Jonathan Miller gently and
wisely rewrote the play by adding a pantomimic epilogue. The couples have found each other and exit
with joy of togetherness. Only Jessica and Antonio
are still on stage. A messenger arrives from Venice
with letters for them . Finally Jessica alone on stage
is left with the realization that despite her . betrayal
of her father and past she will always remain an outsider. Did the director, an assimilated Jew, wish to
stress the futility of ~ssimilation, thus giving the play
a meaning at the last moment it never had?
As Jessica reads the message and muses over it for
a moment, we hear from the distance the Kaddish,
the Jewish prayer of mourning. Is it Jessica who mourns
the death of her father, or is it Shylock's voice mourning Jessica? One leaves the theatre, overwhelmed
by the poetic magnitude of play and acting, wondering about this beautiful world of so many contrasts
and of so much passion and misery, love and hatred .

Resignavon ----------------------------------------------And so . . . what if I cry?
A {ways the return of silence.
The helpless rage
Consuming like a slow fire.

And so . . . why should I cry ?
To chew a bitter resentment
To what end?
Tears dissolve pleasure.
EDITH SU S LICK

September, 1970

19

Political Affairs

Events of the Summer: Continuity and Change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------ayALBERT R.TROST

Having allowed this column to lie fallow for two
months, it seemed useful to attempt a review of significant current events over that period. The problem with such an effort, of course, is that of criteria
of significance. At the end of the year we are used
to seeing TV networks attempt a review, but they usually cop-out by covering "the biggest news events of
the year." This means those stories that received the
most coverage at the time because of perceived audience interest. As we all know, violence will be a large
factor in determining this interest.
I would like to use much more fallible and subjective criteria. What events of the summer seem to have
the most meaning for the longrun viability of the world 's
political systems? When this question is asked , three
events vie for attention. Two of the events have implications for change in the nations in which they
occurred; one points more to continuity in the character of a political system. One of the events is clearly ominous, another is fairly hopeful. The three events
which stand out are the victory of George Wallace
in a run-off primary in Alabama, the death of Antonio
Salazar of Portugal, and the victory of the Conservative Party in the parliamentary elections in Britain .
Having come in second to the incumbent Governor Albert Brewer in the regular primary, Wallace's
victory in the run-off was a little unexpected. Unlike
the campaign a few weeks earlier, Wallace sought
to differentiate himself in the run-off by a strong white
racist appeal. His success means at the least, that instead of going the way of most third-party candidates
into oblivion, he will be around in the national spotlight for the 1972 presidential election. What is especially significant and ominous about his presence
is that the preliminary results of the 1970 census indicate that for the first time in our history the largest
population category is the white suburbanite. That
this group is susceptible to a Wallace-like appeal or
a "Southern strategy" was indicated in a trip made
by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
George Romney, to Detroit suburbs in late July . The
former Governor of Michigan was heckled and riduculed for his integration-directed housing policies.
The absence of George Wallace in 1972 would not
eliminate the problem of racism , but it would eliminate a tempting and mis-guided solution that would
radically change the American political system.
On July 27th, Antonio Salazar, the dictatorial leader of Portugal for almost forty years, died . Although
Salazar was replaced by Marcello Caetano as Premier
m 1968 following a stroke, his continued presence
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gave encouragement to the army and other groups
to maintain the system for which the dictator stood.
Dr. Caetano has already indicated a more lenient
attitude toward the opposition and the press. He has
formally changed the status of the political police
so their role is diminished. One can hardly be less
democratic than Salazar, so Premier Caetano is sure
to make progress in a democratic direction. This will
cause less embarrassment for the United States and
other NATO allies of Portugal. This will also make
Portugal more attractive to the European Cctmmunity movement.
However, Salazar's passing will have the most significance for Africa. Portugal has the largest remaining colonial empire on that continent and Dr. Salazar had a personal stake in its maintenance. Even
Caetano has made no change in Portugal's African
policy. The opposition, however, is strongly against
the holding of possessions there, and the more reign
these politicians are allowed, the more the policy will
be criticized and reformed. Portugal is presently fighting costly guerrilla wars in Africa and there cannot
be popular support in Portugal for this effort.
Change in Portugal will not be of such magnitude
as to turn that political system into the model of liberal democracy. The political culture militates against
such a development, but even minor changes in the
domestic political climate could go a long way toward
changing an international posture in the under-developed world that is a major factor of irritation and instability.
Because the election in Britai11. in June did not get
much news coverage in the United States, its significance may be overlooked. The election was partially eclipsed by the violence in Northern Ireland which
attracted many American reporters. It is precisely
the lack of violence across the Irish Sea in Great Britain that makes the election significant.
The victory of the Conservative Party represents
the fourth change in governmental direction in Britain since World War II. None have provoked violence even though the changes in policy represented in the change in governing party are often great.
The Labor Party coming to power in 1945 represented the nationalization of basic industries. Victories
for the Labor Party in 1964 and 1966 meant changes
in the basic educational system and Britain's status
as one of the great powers, yet the changes were passively accepted. The social peace surrounding the present change from Labor to Conservative is more sigThe Cresset

nificant because it was unexpected. With the voting
age lowered and the economy showing favorable signs,
things seemed to be working in Labor's favor , but
the unexpected happened. Major policy changes
that will continue to test the staying power of the British political system are the resumption of military
support for South Africa and a reversal of the military withdrawal from Asia begun by the Labor Par-

ty. A major dock strike is also complicating matters
at this writing.
Through all this apparent change the British political system remains un-questioned by a very large
majority of its citizens. In view of the events of this
summer in the United States, Portugal, and many
other countries, there are few political systems that
can say as much.

The Mass Media

Proof Through the Night that Y(our) Flag Was S·ti/1 There
By RICHARD LEE

This past summer this writer was in wilderness and
as removed from most mass media as he blissfully
could be. At the height of his holiday he was accessible only by mental telepathy and carrier mosquitoes.
However, to reach his favorite wildernesses and
return he had to drive thousands of miles in sixteen
states. From Flag Day through Independence Day
to Labor Day that meant a grueling over-exposure
to the mass medium of the American flag.
At the risk of courting the wrath wreaked upon George
S. Kaufman one Christmas when he wished he might
never again hear "Silent Night," I could wish never again to see the flag of my country after this summer. One only wonders what national spasm in 1976
can peak such a summer of flag-waving and decalomanla.
On the automobile windshields and bumpers to
the right were flags with captions:
In God We Trusted, In 'Nam We Busted
If Your Heart Isn't In It, Get Your Ass Out of It
THE MARINES - THE MUNCH A VIET CONG
FOR LUNCH BUNCH
USA ALL the Way
These colors don't run!
Agnew Tells It Like It Is
Spiro in '72
GOD BLESS AMERICA AND BOMB HANOI!
And other imprecatory psalms. One bumper sticker on the right embrangled the Confederate secessionist stars and bars with the stars and stripes of the
Republic with the familiar AMERICA - LOVE IT OR
LEAVE IT!
To the left were flags upside down in signals of distress, flags colored conservation green, flags joined
to the CND semaphor, flags with the population theta for the canton, flags with doves and olive branches, flags clasped by black and white hands, flags between V'ed fingers, and one plain 3 x 5 card with only
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the word F•L• A•G printed on it. There were also some
flags personalized with their lovers' disappointments
in America secretly to avoid getting their windows
smashed, motorcycles tipped, or themselves harrassed by the police.
There was some beleaguered humor among all the
scarred, mangled banners. On a VW microbus somewhere west of Wenatchee, Washington, was a straight
American flag undercut with MADE IN JAPAN. Near
Missoula, Montana, on a rancher's dusty Continental
was a flagless sticker reading OUR FLAG IS IN VIETNAM WHERE IT BELONGS. The hooker was on
the other end of the same bumper: WHEN FLAGS
ARE OUTLAWED, ONLY OUTLAWS WILL HAVE
FLAGS! And on a motorcycle windscreen in Sausalito, California, appeared the query ON THE OTHER HAND, HOW MUCH DOES MY COUNTRY
LOVE ME? But generally there was too little humor
to redeem a time when many of us don't like many
of us very much.
Following the flag down the streets and highways
of one nation, divisible, is a study in the unmassing
of a medium. The American flag no longer says one
thing at one time to all. Indeed, those of us who side
neither with the majority on the right nor the minority on the left are now reluctant to display the flag
at all.
On one hand we might appear to be agreeing that
"Lindsay is a Faggot" and "Our Hero is Spiro" or endorsing an oil company's tasteless promotional giveaway. (One of our staunch Republican friends, distressed by the means his party is using to forge its
majority, closeted his flag, muttering: "The flag should
never be displayed after sunset, and this summer is
one long sunset!") On the other hand we might appear to be agreeing that the flag is high camp, a decoration for freaks, and without protocol. At best, we
might only add our flag to the super-saturation of

flags and hasten the ultimate pass1v1ty. Conceivably,
patriotism now resides not only in withdrawing the
flag from Vietnam but also in withdrawing it from
its commercialization and trivialization at home.
Unlike Jesus' gibbet of shame and glory, the American flag has stood only for glory. That is the chief
flaw at the foundation of its mythology, and it is now
necessarily being restored to its contradictions. "Old
Glory" is sticking all over a nation that enslaved one
race ~nd nigh decimated another in its formation.
Now the flag advances, even to the moon, over a nation
living rapaciously off half the world's resources and by
the suffering of many who rightly need fear such a
flag and the dollar sign for which it stands.
The brother waving the flag without repenting the
shame in its glory and without rising to the wrongs
it yet summons him to right is a man without a country. His flag may be a fetish. Or a golden calf. Or a
reassuring shaft for his hard-hat masculinity. His
flag may even be the wave of an ignoble future. But
he sadly has no real citizenship in the shame and glory
of the real United States of America. The citizens of
that country have as much soil and blood on their
flag from the travail of nation building as many in
history, if less than some still more than others. And
they have before them civil and global atonements

for which no flag-waving will substitute if the promises of America are to be fulfilled.
The unmassing of the medium of the flag would
be no daqger to a democracy. Indeed, the more. genuine the democracy the more one would expect the
flag personalized with individual meanings and minority hopes. It would be a flag least divinized with
mystique. One ur-flag of our country, after all, simply was "Don't Tread On Me."
The danger to democracy is rather that anxious,
religious, mass flag-waving which triggers reflexes
negating democratic behavior: total commitment,
passionate immoderation, dogmatism, intolerance,
conformity, contempt for differences, and finally suspicion of all men.
The political commentary of a critic of the mass
media is, of course, worth next to nothing. But when
democracy becomes a show' taking the flag on the
road, he properly comments on the performance.
And what he sees is democracy propagandized: the
negation of democracy by turning it into something
mythical, evoking belief, primitive feelings, and liturgies. Flag-waving which becomes such a simple incitation in no way disposes citizens for democratic
acts. Frankly, it quickens all our vigilante tendencies and arouses men who recite democratic formulas and behave like totalitarians.

Books of the Month

A New Look at an Old Radical
HUEY LONG. By T . Harry Williams . New
York : Alfred A. Knopf , 1969 .
Once, in a New Orleans hotel suite, a group
of reporters discussed the personality of
" Kingfish " Huey Long while the Southern
political boss slept on one of the hotel beds.
Finally. the story goes. Long woke up , listened for a moment and ended the discussion
quickly. "Oh hell ," he said . "say that I'm
sui generis and let it go at that." For years ,
historians have followed Long's advice. Some
have maintained that Huey Long could have
gained power onl y in Louisiana where the
citizens accepted the governmental corruption
which enabled him to control the state so completely . Others claim that Long's oratorical
skills gave him an unusual ability to play on
the fears and aspirations of the poor American
or insist that the Depression presented him
with a unique opportunity to practice his
demagoguery. But most have agreed that
Long was an aberration within American
politics. an object of curiosity but not a subject for serious study.
In an attempt to place Huey Long within
the American tradition. T. Harry Williams
rejects these explanations of Long's power
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and popularity . Long's ideas, rhetoric, and
techniques were not uniquely his own , or even
typically Southern, Williams insists. His use
of patronage to control his state political
machine, for example, was based on the
standard rule that an organization rewards
its friends and punishes its enemies. Much
of his rhetoric , similarly , derived its force
from the traditional rural distrust of Eastern
bankers and city-based capitalists - a sentiment which the Populist movement had
helped to create. By combining this radical
rhetoric with the skill of a politician, Long
created the most powerful political machine
in America in the 1920's and built a national
movement which, by 1934 , was strong enough
to frighten even Franklin Roosevelt.
Long understood the desires of the poor
American. His home county , Winn Parish .
had always been among the poorest and most
radical in Louisiana. When the state joined
the Confederacy in 1861 , the citizens of the
parish , certain that the rich planting inter·
ests had engineered the war. refused to allow
their representative to sign the act of secession . Later. when agricultural discontent
swept the Midwest and South, the parish was

one of the strongest centers of Populism in
the nation.
Although Huey 's father was never a Populist, the son absorbed the movement's rhetoric . At the age of 15 . Williams notes, Huey
used Populist arguments skillfully in a debate
against a leading Louisiana Socialist and won
the support of his audience. His talent for
public speaking convinced him that he had
the ability to persuade people of virtually
anything and led him to decide to become a
traveling salesman .
Immediately after graduation , Huey
travelled to New Orleans where a cooking
oil company hired him as their representative.
A succession of selling jobs followed , and soon
Huey proved that his evaluation of himself
was correct. He could sell almost anything from cotton-seed oil to canned meats . But
when he persuaded a Houston plumbing contractor to hire him as a stenographer. even
though he knew no shorthand, Huey made
his most important discovery: He was most
skillful at selling himself.
Over the protest of his family , Long decided to quit his selling jobs , read for the
Louisiana Bar, and involve himself in politics.
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His experience with Louisiana's workmen 's
compensation laws soon convinced him that
the existing statutes favored the large corporations rather than the workers , and , at the
age of 22 , he began a fight for an increase in
the amount of benefits paid to the disabled.
By the time that the bill was passed , the entire state knew Huey as the clever young lawyer who had challenged the powerful corporations and won. In 1918 , sensing his popularity , Long decided to run for a vacant seat on
the Board of Railroad Commissioners - a
body traditionally under the influence of the
major railroads serving Louisiana.
Huey was elected Commissioner by promising the Louisiana farmer that he would fight
for better railroad service, and after his election he did not forget that pledge. By this
time , Williams insists, Long had decided that
he could be governor of the state someday
and, to provide himself with an issue popular
with the Louisiana poor, launched an attack
upon the railroad rate structure, a standard
target of southern Populists a generation
earlier. When the power of the Railroad Commission was expanded to include all public
utilities , Huey once again gained state-wide
fame when he forced the Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company to rescind a
rate increase. The company had intended to
refund the over-payments by reducing future
bills, but Huey , with the instincts of a surefooted politician , gained the gratitude of the
company's subscribers when he forced the
corporation to make all refunds immediately
- by check .

Not Enough Money to Beat Him
By 1923 , Huey was sure that he could win
the governorship and began a slashing campaign against the regular Louisiana political
machine. His opponents were controlled by
the corporate interests, he insisted , and Standard Oil was behind the attempt to defeat
him . Williams claims that Long's accusations
were not fabrications. The vice-president of
Standard Oil actually did send agents throughout the state to instruct businessmen that they
should not support the unpredictable Public
Service Commissioner. On election day , Huey
was defeated , although at least one large contributor to his opponent's campaign fund prepared to support him in the next election .
"We can't raise enough money to beat him
again ," he warned the anti-Long politicians .
Immediately after his defeat, Long began
strengthening his organization in preparation
for the 1927 election . He formed alliances
with New Orleans politicians traditionally
hostile to the rural rhetoric which he employed and gained support among the French
of southwestern Louisiana by co-{)perating
with their hero , Senator Edward Broussard .
But while he strengthened his political ties .
he continued to employ the radical rhetoric
which had been so effective in his earlier campaigns. Once again , Standard Oil was hi s
target, and he claimed that the easterncontrolled corporation had bribed the incum-
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bent governor to prevent New Orleans from
constructing natural gas pipelines. For three
years , Huey continued his attacks upon the
administration until the fears of the opposition proved correct. Williams estimates that
Long's opponents were able to raise only
one-tenth of the money they needed to defeat
him , and in 1928 he was inaugurated governor of the state.
Many of the established politicians were
certain that Huey had only used reform as an
issue to sweep him into office. They soon discovered , however, that he took all his election
pledges quite seriously . Under his direction ,
the Louisiana legislature passed bills providing for free schoolbooks , natural gas pipelines for New Orleans and toll-free bridges
and highways. But when Huey called a special session of the legislature in early 1929
to enact a manufacturer's tax on the refining
of oil, he discovered that he had pushed the
state's business interests too far . Convinced
that such a bill would bring economic ruin to
Louisiana, a group of leading businessmen
and industrialists began to exert pressure on
the Louisiana legislature to impeach Long,
convict him , and replace him with a governor
more amenable to the state's financial interests .
Williams reminds us that the impeachment attempt was the most serious crisis of
Long's career and that his handling of his
defense reveals his skill in both politics and
propaganda. Upon hearing of the attempt to
remove him from office, Huey immediately
announced that his old enemy, Standard Oil
was behind the move. The legislature had
been offered bribes by the company, he insisted , and any representative who voted
against him had obviously received large
sums from the corporation . After the House
voted impeachment, however, Huey knew
that only skillful legislative maneuvering
could prevent his conviction by the Senate.
By offering jobs , new roads , and other favors ,
he obtained the votes of enough senators to
ensure his acquittal. Significantly , Huey saw
no inconsistency between his attacks on
Standard Oil for buying votes and his own
open offers of favors to those who supported
him .
By 1930 , Long completely controlled the
government of Louisiana, but he soon felt
that the state did not provide sufficient
opportunity for exercise of his talents. Since
he totally controlled the state Democratic
party as well , he decided to become a Senator
and bring his ideas for economic reform to
the attention of the nation .
Huey called his national program "Share
Our Wealth ." Firmly based on the traditional
Populist-Progressive belief that wealth in
America was unfairly and unnaturally distributed , the plan contained a one hundred
per cent income tax on all yearly income
over a million dollars . With the money obtained from such a tax , Huey assured poor
Americans that the federal government could
provide each family with a yearly income of at

least two thousand dollars. When conservatives questioned the economics and administration of such a plan, Huey admitted that
the details were hazy. But he insisted that
Share Our Wealth's operation could be worked out by "great minds" after it passed into
law .

Sharing the Wealth of the Nation
Williams claims , however , that the political impact of the plan was more important
to Huey than its practicality. For by the end
of 1934 , approximately four million Americans belonged to Share Our Wealth Clubs.
Scattered throughout the nation , these chapters provided a national political organization for Long when he made his planned
attempt to win the Presidency in 1936 . But
before Huey had the opportunity to use the
organization which he had so carefully built,
he was assassinated in the halls of the Louisiana State Capitol Building, and the movement largely dissolved.
At the time of Long's death , however , he
had already significantly affected American
politics. At least one piece of "New Deal"
legislation (the Frazier-Lemke Farm Purchase
Act) was , in fact , opposed by Roosevelt and
passed the Senate only because of Huey's
threat to filibuster until the conservative
Senate Majority Leader, Joseph Robinson ,
brought it to a vote. In addition , Franklin
Roosevelt's "shift to the left" in 1935 is frequently attributed to his fear of Long and his
desire to weaken the Share Our Wealth
movement.
In general , considering Long's impact on
America in the early 1930 's, it is strange that
Williams' book is the first major biography
of Long ever attempted . The reason that historians have so neglected the Long story is
not difficult to discover , however. Long wrote
no detailed letters to his associates . kept no
diary and few records of his political maneuverings. As a result , virtually no written
sources exist which could serve as the basis
of a detailed biography.
Such an impediment did not discourage
Williams. He saw an opportunity to use the
oral sources which historians of recent America have so often recommended as valuable
but have so rarely employed . To research
Long's life, Williams interviewed Huey's
friends , enemies , and political associates. By
questioning 305 persons (from Long 's bodyguards to Harry S Truman), he obtained the
reminiscences and anecdotes which he has
woven into a remarkably coherent narrative.
The result is a carefully written work which
places Huey Long within the tradition of
American politics. But this first major American biography to rely primarily on oral sources
and the first significant attempt to see H uey
Long a~ a part of the American tradition ,
Williams well-balanced account is sui genens
indeed.

RONALD SCHLUNDT
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The Visual Arts

Wood
RICHARD H. W. BRAUER
By DEAN BOWMAN

In the history of sculpture, wood has had as much attention by artists as any other material. There is good
reason for this. No other material offers the range in
color and density as wood. Because of its "grain" and
"imperfections" like cracks and knots, it has a will of its
own. It fights back and resists casual efforts by the sculptor.
On the other hand , by making the least concessions to
its properties, wood responds handsomely. For instance,
a well sharpened chisel seems to be further honed when
used on hardwoods such as walnut, cherry, or African
mahogany. A cut with the grain leaves a clean, polished
surface. Grain lines can be controlled to conform naturally to the desired shape thereby adding color, variety,
and excitement.
Yet, in spite of its good qualities, wood has always
been a secondary material when large, monumental
works were being considered. Where such works were
concerned, sculptors usually turned to marble or bronze.
There are two basic reasons for bypassing wood as a
material for large monuments. First, the notion that

Dean B. Bowman, GOOD SAMARITAN,
1967, laminated oak panel, 6' x 4', Chapel
of Good Samarita n Hospital , Rugby, North
Dakota. Strand Studio photograph .
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Dean B. Bowman,
PIETA , 1948-49 .
walnut, 66" high ,
University of Iowa

wood is not permanent, and second, wood is limited by
the size of the log.
It is true that wood, being organic, has always been
subject to attack by disease and insects. And of course,
wood can be consumed by fire. But bronze and stone are
not totally immune to damage or destruction. Over a
period of time, wind, sun and rain can errode even the
finest marble. Even more destructive than the elements
is man. In ancient times each generation seemed to wish
to obliterate any memory of its predecessors by smashing or disfiguring their monuments. Bronze works were
often melted down for utilitarian or military purposes.
Such destruction is by no means limited to the past.
Modern warfare is ruthless in its destruction and the
losses that occur daily to artistic works of all kinds are
1
incalculable.
'
While there is no protection for art works from the
destructiveness of man, technology has produced the
means to protect wooden objects from the attack of disease and insects. Seals and plastic coatings protect from
the elements. Barring willful destruction by man, the
survival of a particular work in wood is reasonably
assured for an indefinite period of time.
If it can be established that permanence is about equal

Dean B. Bowman,
TWO FIGURES,
1968 ,
walnut ,
iron , 66" high .

Dean B. Bowman, THE WALL, 1970, walnut, copper, iron, 48 x 30"
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between wood, stone, and bronze, what about size? How
can wood compete with stone which can be quarried in
any size? Or with bronze which is limited only by the
size of the foundry?
In the past the most positive size for a piece of wood
was the size of the log. Small pieces were fastened together with carefully made joints, pegs or with glues
made of animal residues. But because wood moves with
changes in humidity and temperature, the best glues
would dry out and the finest joints loosen.
Today woodworkers have been given another assist
by technology. Synthetic glues (epoxy and polymer resins) produce positive bonds between pieces of wood.
These bonding agents retain their plasticity and are
therefore able to shift as the wood shifts. The worker in
wood is no longer limited by the size of the log. He can
use boards that have been thoroughly dried and laminate
them in any shape or size.
The panel depicting scenes from the parable of the
Good Samaritan is an example of such lamination. It
is made up of 1" x 3" oak boards bonded on the flat grain.
This kind of lamination makes possible cross-grain carving of considerable detail without the usual splintering.
Wood can be joined together by means other than the
use of bonding agents. The work titled THE WALL consists of separate boards fastened to a support with steel
bolts. It is intended to bring to mind the wall that separates Berlin or the wall that each human being raises
between himself and other human beings.
TWO FIGURES is another example making use of
steel to hold the various parts together. In this work
functional bolts are combined with other pieces of iron
that give a pleasing metallic contrast with the wood.
Contrasting iron and wood can heighten the expressive intent of the work. The idea is certainly not new;
such combinations can be seen all around in common
objects: telephone poles, bridges, fences, railways, boxcars, scaffolding, fine automobiles, not to mention interior furnishings.
The use of modern power tools has added a new dimension to wood carving. Large logs or timbers can be
roughed out with a portable power chain saw. Curved
cuts can be made with a band saw or a sabre saw.
LOT'S WIFE is the result of "slabbing" with a chain
saw. The piece was subsequently sanded smooth, oiled
and polished.
Wood is a material with a wide range of intriguing
characteristics. Having once been alive is continues
to show "living" properties long after being cured, dried
and aged. It contracts and expands with the seasons; it
is never dormant.
Because of this "aliveness" wood is a most fitting material for decoration or expressive purposes in our
churches and homes.
Dean Bowman teaches art at Concordia College. Moorhead . Minnesota.
He is active in creating sculpture that has Christian subject matter
and expression .
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Dean B. Bowman . LOT'S WIFE , 1963, walnut , 30 " high.
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Education

Toward a Civic Pedagogy
------------------------------------------------------------------------By STEPHEN A. SCHMIDT

"Pedagogy is the science of transforming societies."
-Jose Ortega y Gasset

In retrospect, George S. Count's widely published statement in 1932, "Dare The Schools Build A New
Social Order?," can be judged as a typical instance
of the arrogance so characteristic of American educators. School men in America have maintained the
myth that schools teach and change society for longer years than I care to name.
The legend of public school education as an agency with potential to change America is a hallowed
educational dream, nurtured by the rhetoric of the
fathers. The ideals of Franklin, Jefferson, Mann, Harris and Dewey all find fruition in the formation of
a public school system to educate the public. Educationists maintain a multi-billion dollar yearly establishment to maintain that sacred myth.
Other voices from our more recent educational
past have held a different view. Their view has extended beyond the provincialism of the agency, the
school. The educational insights of Horace Bushnell
have largely been overlooked in the development
of American Education. Bushnell called for an "organic" educational strategy. He believed that all institutions must be unified in harmony to form young
persons. He realized and articulated the formative
values of the cultural milieu.
His educational theory, outlined in Christian Nurture, has too long been neglected by educators throughout America. His ideal was not lost, however, on another church educator of the early twentieth century.
George Albert Coe, known to many as the father of
the Religious Education Movement in America, modified Bushnell's "organic" ideal to a broad democratic vision. Coe held a view of a civic pedagogy where
persons would be formed in the total community.
He called for a "Democracy of God" (inflated rhetoric for the reality he sought) where love and justice meet. His word was a dear call to educate in the
public political sphere. The insight of a host of religious educators around Coe has been ignored by
secular and church educators today. To pay close attention to Coe's vision would amount to a wholesale
redirection in American education.
It would cause us to take seriously the development
of Civic Pedagogues. A civic pedagogue is one who
educates society by political thought and political
action. Such teachers would be conscious of the impact of culture and subculture which limit their en-

26

vironments. They would bear the ancient insight of
the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the early Christians.
They would understand that a community educates,
by the very existence of its ideals, values, structures,
and life. Charles Stinnette's monograph, Learning
in Theological Perspective, outlines in vivid detail
the civic educational thought of those ancient communities. It would serve as a fine primer for the neophyte civic pedagogue.
Civic pedagogues would, of course, have to be equipped with necessary skills in their professional training. They would have professional courses not only
in classroom methods, but in political science and
political action. They would understand the structures of the system and how to effect change.
They would be about keeping the "ideal" alive and
they would measure and judge all structures and all
institutions according to the "ideal." They would not
be system persons, but rather would be pedagogical
prophets. They would know what George Leonard
understands in his recent book Education and Ecstasy .
They would know that education takes place in "structured environments," realizing full well that the ultimate environment is culture.
I would like to extend this brief analysis to make
a few positive suggestions relative to the life and work
of the church and specifically the Lutheran Church,
Missouri Synod.
The church ought not de-emphasise its educational activity. Rather it must intensify such endeavor,
attempting to influence our age with justice and compassion. That task will be the responsibility of the
civic pedagogues who educate where the action is
... in real life politics.
The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, rich with
educational tradition, must free its pedagogues to
act in formative positions. Lutheran teachers must
insist upon immediate franchise within the church.
They must then exercise franchise by positive political responsibility within the church and the wider public educational domain.
The pedagogues of the synod must form an agency of redress, a Teachers Union, to safeguard the freedom of the civic pedagogue when the political position threatens the status quo.
If these suggestions were implemented, then perhaps we could create a reality out of our rhetoric. And
the myth of public education might yet reveal an essential truth. Teaching is, of course, a political act,
and all our deeds are ultimately instruction.
The Cresset

Editor-At-Large

By JOHN STRIETELMEIER

Learning 1n a Time of Crisis

I am open to persuasion, but as of now, after thinking about it a great deal this past summer, I am opposed to the idea of closing colleges and universities
for two weeks prior to the elections this fall so that
students may get involved in the political process.
There are no doubt students who feel obliged in
conscience to interrupt their ordinary work to participate in a campaign for some candidate who espouses
policies in which they deeply believe or, more likely, to work toward the defeat of some incumbent whom
they hold accountable for our present difficulties.
These students should be given every possible encouragement to act on their convictions. But if my
own university is typical, and I am pretty sure that
it is, the number of such students is quite small, certainly no larger than ten per cent of the student body.
The other ninety per cent plus are not so persuaded,
and they ought not to be denied their right to go peacefully about their business.
I have great difficulty anyway with the idea that
every new crisis in the ongoing agony of our society
is an occasion for shutting up the academic shop. If
what we are doing on the campus, if this whole business of gathering and evaluating information, if the
clashing and testing of ideas is all Mickey Mouse,
to be abandoned as soon as something really 'relevant'
comes along, then there .is no justification for the university in the first place. Society can not afford to maintain several millions of its members in subsidized diddling. But if the university, in its ordinary, day-byday round of work, is performing a useful and perhaps even essential social function, it makes no sense
to close it down so that its members may all take off
and do something presumably more urgent or, at
least, more significant.
England did not close its great universities even
during those grim days when invasion seemed imminent. The reasons why she did not dare set forth
in a short essay by C.S. Lewis entitled "Learning in
Wartime," an essay which I commend to the attention of those students especially who are seriously
concerned about the present crisis and troubled by
the thought that they ought to be more immediately involved in its solution.
The chief point that Dr. Lewis makes in this essay
is that if mankind had decided to postpone the search
for truth and beauty and wisdom until things settled
September, 1970

down, the search would never have been undertaken at all. Human history is the record of one crisis
following upon the heels of another. But man decided
long ago that truth and beauty and wisdom are not
optional extras; they are as essential to man's humanity as food, drink, clothing, and shelter. Without
them, man ceases to be man in the full sense of the
word and becomes something other and less than man .
And so there must be in every society those who devote themselves to enlarging and diffusing man's supply of truth, beauty, and wisdom, even when this task
seems unimportant by comparison with apparently larger and more urgent demands.
In a situation such as ours, it becomes necessary
for every member of the university community faculty, administrators, and students - to make sure
in his own conscience that he is about his proper business. It may very well be that considerable numbers
of us could contribute more to the general welfare
by interrupting or abandoning the life of scholarship
for the sake of greater involvement in the critical problems of our times. Our calling may not be to the university, but to the ghetto or the legislative chamber
or the courtroom or even to the street. If that is the
case, we should follow our calling and do the thing
we are persuaded we ought to do. But we should not
demand that the university transmogrify itself into
something that it is not and was never intended to
be. We should allow it to remain an open market for
ideas (the only function which has ever really justified its existence) and we shou ld seek or build other institutions to use ideas as weapons for the achievement of this or that particular social objective.
No doubt it seems that I am asking for the university a kind of detachment from "real life" and a kind
of exemption from involvement in the turbulence
of our times. In a sense, that it what I am asking, but
not as a privilege but as a necessity for the carrying
out of its unique task for society. Somewhere, in the
raging cross-currents of our time, there must be a place
of central calm where ideas are subjected to the dispassionate arbitrament of reason, where the phony
and the half-true are exposed, anct where truth (however unpleasant) has a chance to reveal itself. This
has historically been the task of the university. If this
is no longer to be her task, whom shall we ask to do
the job?
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The Pilgrim

By 0. P . KRETZMANN

"All the trumbets sounded for him on th e other side"
PILGRil\I"S PROGRESS

HIC et NUNC -

et HERE

For the benefit of my readers under thirty, the words
at the head of this column are Latin for "Here and Now
- and Yesterday" and will appear over this column for
a few months while my eldest son and I conduct an
experiment. ...
"Here and Now" reflects the new generation, everybody under thirty, the young, the very young, men and
women whose motto is "here and now" .... We want our
rights "here and now" .... We will not go to war "here
and now " ... . We don 't like the words and ways of the
older generation "here and now" ....
The last word in our heading means "Yesterday" and
includes all of us over thirty .... me .... the has beens
. ... the never wases .... the generation that has brought
the world to the edge of disaster, the villains who are
responsible for everything bad and nothing good ....
the Nixons and Daleys and Agnews, the last gasp of a
dying generation ....
We shall conduct the column like this .. .. D . v. I
shall write every other month .... My eldest son, a notorious member of the "here and now" generation, will
write in alternate months . ... He is well qualified for
the task .. . . He has long hair (but is, thank God, not a
hippie), was the editor of a college daily, has written for
the underground press, and is now a more or less respected college teacher. ... He writes better than his
old man , but with fewer ideas . ... He is now teaching
"U rban Studies" ....
It is interesting to me that all these unshorn characters invariably land in our ghettos, the lowest and darkest part of our world .... Then, they say and think, we've
really got our elders .. . . They, the elders, allowed these
black spots on our banners, and with the Bowery and
South State Street we must eliminate their authors and
finishers ... . They were in their limited way nice people, but their day is done .... The sun is going down and
they belong to "here " - to yesterday ....
With an anticipating gleam in his eye he (his name is
"Jody'') is now waiting for my first blast. ...
Basically he is not a bad sort. ... He loves his mother
almost as much as the ghetto . . .. On Father's Day he
borrows a half dollar from his mother and buys a tie that
only he can wear- and in the ghetto at that. ...
But let us be fair to the "hie et nunc " generation . ...
After all, we brought them into a world which was a!28

ready crowded with shallow, shouting nuts .... We must
be patient and tolerant. . . .
But not too much .... An age is known by what it tolerates and we, the "here " generation have been tolerant too long and too much .... We, too, must say "hie
et nunc" enough ... . I cannot go into all the shoddy
thoughts and loose ethics of the "hie et nunc " children
. ... I open my Bible and stare at Job 32:2 .. .. The halfbaked campus activists, confused amateur theologists,
and those going along for the hell of it, will greet these
lines with a lofty pity .... "The old fossil" - his grave
is already dug .... And so is the grave ready for the institutional church which he and his kind represent. ...
I am writing this to the accompaniment of Bach's
"Jesu, Joy of Man's Desiring" ... . I find this frighteningly necessary as I survey the persistent and terrifying
list of their hates ....
Items : They hate their parents (they sure goofed) ,
all government officials, all Synodical leaders and
boards, all pastors and teachers, all professors, all universities except San Francisco State, almost all whites,
many fellow Christians, the Pope, and, of course, the
Church . . . . In contrast to the "here " generation the
youth of the "hie e t nunc" generation is now "youth led"
and "issue oriented" .. . . "We march to a different drum
and it is not played by parents, teachers and pastors" ....
Perhaps the most mysterious part of the thought process of the "hie et nunc " generation is its shallow concept of freedom .... It is always freedom "from", never
freedom "for" .... This is not the freedom of Jesus Christ ;
it is the last dying gasp of twentieth century license now by a curiously delayed osmosis heard in the rear
pews of the Church .... Yes, there are real and present
faults in the Church, but they will not be mended by
unintelligent echoes of a dissident world, by marching
in the rain and going home to a good meal prepared
by the "here "generation .... We have wronged the black
brother and the poor. ... But your proposed cures are
worse than the disease .... You cannot, you must not
substitute a religion of reform for a religion of the redemption . .. .
And so, my dear "hie et nunc " son, I question your intelligence and your apparent inability to think clearly
... . My basic indictment is intellectual. ... You will
not build a "new church" out of the tag ends of a secular philosophy of life and history which is already exhausted and dying ....
Get with it- and God love you!
The Cresset

